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THE USE OF TAX LAW TO STABILIZE THE STOCK 
MARKET: THE EFFICACY OF HOLDING PERIOD 
REQUIREMENTS 
James R. Repetti* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For over half a century, federal income tax laws have employed 
holding period requirements in order to discourage stock market 
speculation. In particular, investors have been required to hold 
capital assets for a specified period of time in order to qualify for 
the long-term capital gains preference, and mutual funds are cur-
rently required to derive less than thirty percent of their income 
from the sale or other disposition of stock held for less than three 
months in order to be taxed as flow-through entities. This article 
proposes that the use of holding periods to curb speculation is in-
appropriate and decreases societal welfare. 
Speculation has been condemned for many reasons. Speculation 
was initially viewed as an evil because it was perceived to be sy-
nonymous with market manipulation. l Although no longer viewed 
as a form of market manipulation, speculation has recently 
regained suspect status as a result of being linked to volatility in 
stock prices. For example, the Report of the Presidential Task 
Force on Market Mechanisms suggested that part of the unprece-
dented rise in stock prices during the summer of 1987 which pre-
ceded the stock market crash in October, 1987 was attributable to 
speculation by institutions which invested heavily in common 
stocks during the rising market.2 Similarly, the General Accounting 
Office Report to Congress on the October 1987 stock market crash 
attributed the inflated market which preceded the crash in part to 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author wishes to thank 
Hugh J. Ault, Denis J. Brion, David S. Davenport, Scott T. FitzGibbon and James D. Rog-
ers for helpful comments. Thanks are also owed to Roger French for research assistance and 
Fran Piscatelli for typing assistance. 
1 See N.Y. Stock Exch. Office of Economic Research, An Analysis of the Capital Gains 
Holding Period 6 (July 1982) (citing Untermyer, Speculation on the Stock Exchanges and 
Public Regulation of the Exchanges, in Am. Econ. Ass'n Meeting, Speculation on the Stock 
Exchanges (December, 1914). 
• See Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms 1-1 (Jan. 8, 1988). 
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excessive speculation.3 Felix G. Rohatyn of Lazard Freres & Co. 
summarized the perceived relationship between speculation and 
stock market volatility when he stated: 
The fundamental weakness in the securities markets, world-wide, 
is the result of excessive speculation, excessive use of credit, and 
inadequate regulation. This speculative behavior is not driven by 
individuals, as was the case in the 1920's, but by such institutions 
as pension funds, banks, savings and loans and insurance compa-
nies. In many cases these institutions are backed by federal govern-
ment guarantees. Curbing speculation and promoting investment 
must be the objective of reform.' 
As part of his solution to curb speculation, Rohatyn suggested 
that a fifty-percent tax be imposed on gains from the sale or ex-
change of securities held for less than a year. This tax would be 
applied to entities which are currently tax-exempt as well as taxa-
ble entities. He also suggested that the tax on capital gains should 
be reduced to fifteen percent for securities held for more than five 
years.~ 
The Treasury Department has similarly intimated that the in-
creased volatility of the stock market may be related to the repeal 
of the long-term capital gains preference and its concomitant hold-
ing period requirement in 1986.6 Moreover, the Staff of the Joint 
Committee on Taxation has noted that if a stock transfer tax is 
• Stock Market Crash of October 1987, GAO Preliminary Report to Congress 38, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1271, Feb. 3, 1988, Part II at 38 (market participants which had 
been interviewed attributed the inflated market to "the belief of many investors that they 
were international financial experts and by their desire to make the last dollar before taking 
their profits in an overvalued market"). See also Sloan & Stern, How Vo = Vs N(dl) - E/e 
tN(d2) Led to Black Monday, 141 Forbes, Jan. 25, 1988, at 55, 56 (speculation contributed 
to market crash because traders believed that they had eliminated risks). 
• See Rohatyn, Institutional "Investor" or "Speculator"?, Wall St. J., June 24, 1988, at 
18, col. 4. 
• See id. Similarly, Professor Louis Lowenstein has recommended that an appropriate 
method to curb speculation would be to apply a one hundred percent tax to gains on stocks 
held for less than one year. Lowenstein, Wall Street, Take A Valium, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 
1987 at 27, col. 3. 
• See M. Darby, R. Gillingham & J. Greenlees, The Direct Revenue Effects of Capital 
Gains Taxation: A Reconsideration of the Time-Series Evidence 2 (Office of the Assistant 
Sec'y for Econ. Policy, U.S. Treas. Dep't Research Paper No. 8801, 1988) ("Among the 
many important topics in capital gains tax law, such as its influence on stock market volatil-
ity or the proper treatment of inflation, the issue of revenue estimation remains the subject 
of greatest controversy and debate.") 
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enacted, it may be desirable to apply a higher tax to stocks with 
shorter holding periods in order to discourage speculation.7 
To date, no study has been published which examines the im-
pact of the repeal of the long-term capital gains preference on 
stock market volatility. However, recent studies indicate that the 
increase in stock market volatility coincided with the repeal of the 
long-term capital gains preference.8 It is possible that this increase 
in volatility was attributable to the repeal of the long-term capital 
gains preference which generally applied to stock purchased on or 
after July 1, 1986 and for stock sold after December 31, 1986. How-
ever, as this article will discuss9 , several other plausible explana-
tions exist for the increased volatility as well. 
Even after the repeal of the capital gains deduction, the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code") still contains a 
provision directed at curbing speculation. Section 851(b)(3) of the 
Code requires that regulated investment companies, generally 
known as mutual funds, derive less than thirty percent of their 
gross income from the sale or exchange of securities held for less 
than three months in order to retain status as a flow-through en-
tity for federal income tax purposes. to This provision is often re-
ferred to as the "short-short" rule. If a mutual fund does obtain 
thirty percent or more of its gross revenues from the sale of securi-
ties held less than three months, its flow-through status is in effect 
revoked with the result that its earnings are taxed twice-once 
when the mutual fund earns taxable income and again when the 
earnings are distributed as dividends to its stockholders. 11 
7 See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Memorandum on Issues Relating to Imposition 
of Securities Transfer Excise Tax, reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 89 J-l (May 11, 
1987). 
8 See Davis & White, Stock Market Volatility, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System Staff Study No. 1536-7 (Aug. 1987); Edwards, Does Futures Trading Increase Stock 
Market Volatility?, 44 Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 63, 67. 
• See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
10 See I.R.C. § 851(b)(3). Section 851(b)(3) provides: 
(b) Limitations. - A corporation shall not be considered a regulated investment company 
for any taxable year unless - . . . 
(3)less than 30 percent of its gross income is derived from the sale or other disposition of 
stock or securities held for less than 3 months . . . . 
11 See I.R.C. § 852(b)(l). Section 852(b)(l) states that the normal corporate tax will be 
applied to "investment company taxable income." Section 852(b)(2) defines the term "in-
vestment company taxable income" to mean generally undistributed income of the mutual 
fund. 
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This article proposes that the use of holding period requirements 
in the Code to curb speculation and thereby decrease stock market 
volatility is inappropriate for two reasons. First, at this time, there 
is no conclusive evidence that the type of short-term trading which 
holding period requirements seek to discourage contributes to 
stock market volatility. Second, even if short-term trading does in-
crease stock market volatility, holding period requirements are not 
an appropriate response, because they distort the market. This dis-
tortion decreases societal welfare by causing stock prices to vary 
from the stocks' fundamental values which would be established in 
a rationally efficient market without such requirements.12 In a ra-
tionally efficient stock market, prices of stocks are determined in a 
way which equates the marginal rates of return, adjusted for risk, 
for all producers and savers. Thus, in a rationally efficient market, 
prices of stock provide the mechanism by which scarce resources 
are allocated among productive assets in order to maximize societal 
welfare. By causing stock prices to vary from their fundamental 
value, holding periods result in misallocations of resources and a 
reduction in societal welfare. 
Holding period requirements cause stock prices to vary from 
their fundamental value because they artificially decrease the sup-
ply of securities by encouraging investors to hold securities when 
real economic factors might dictate that the investors sell. This de-
crease in supply contributes to the inflation of stock prices above 
their fundamental values. After the holding period expires, inves-
tors may then sell their stocks and increase the supply of securi-
ties, thereby contributing to a decrease in prices. 
Although investors acting independently of one another in 
purchasing and selling securities might not have a major impact on 
stock market prices, theories and studies about investor behavior 
indicate that investors do not act independently. Instead, the 
"herd" instinct plays a major role in investor behavior. Thus, in-
vestors tend to be simultaneously attracted to securities in a rising 
market. Their combined purchases of securities, in conjunction 
with a holding period requirement, can have the effect of inflating 
prices. If public sentiment turns negative, stock prices may then 
decrease rapidly as investors sell. Indeed, prices may drop below 
II The term "fundamental value" is defined more fully in the text accompanying note 77, 
infra. 
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their fundamental values because studies indicate that investors 
overreact to negative news. 
Because holding period requirements decrease societal welfare 
by distorting the market, this article concludes that the holding 
period requirement of the short-short rule should be repealed, and 
that the preference for long-term capital gains should not be reen-
acted, if the primary purpose for its reenactment is to deter short-
term trading. 
This article is organized in the following manner. Part II briefly 
examines the legislative history of the use of holding period re-
quirements in order to establish that one of the primary purposes 
of the holding period requirement for the short-short rule and 
long-term capital gains preference was to discourage speculation. 
Part III then surveys studies which have attempted to analyze the 
impact of speculation on stock market volatility. Part III decides 
that the studies are inconclusive as to whether speculation in-
creases or decreases stock market volatility. 
Part IV argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry regarding 
speculation is not whether speculation increases volatility, but 
whether it decreases societal welfare. Even if short-term trading 
increases the volatility of stock prices, that volatility would not be 
harmful unless it caused stock prices to vary from their fundamen-
tal values as determined in a rationally efficient stock market. 
Under the efficient market theory, rational investors assure that 
prices do not stray from their fundamental values. Thus, if the 
stock market behaves like a rationally efficient market, holding pe-
riods are not needed. Indeed, Part IV, asserts, holding period re-
quirements cause prices to vary from their fundamental values in a 
rationally efficient market by artificially restricting the supply of 
securities. 
Part V explains that it is far from clear that the stock market 
behaves like a rationally efficient market. However, Part V further 
states that holding period requirements also cause stock prices to 
vary from their fundamental values in an irrational stock market 
because they decrease the supply of stocks and, in certain in-
stances, they may reinforce irrational investor behavior. Part VI 
makes policy recommendations based on the foregoing analysis. 
II. THE HISTORIC RATIONALE FOR HOLDING PERIODS 
At the outset it should be noted that several definitions of the 
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term "speculation" exist. IS One definition of speculation is pay-
ment for a security in excess of a price merited by its previous 
earnings in the hope that the price will continue to rise.14 Another 
describes the term simply as the purchase of an item with a view 
to selling it at a higher price. III Still another modifies the latter 
definition by injecting a temporal aspect: speculation is the 
purchase of an item with a view to selling it at a higher price 
within a short period of time. I6 This last definition of speculation 
has been embodied in the federal income tax policy.I7 
A. The Capital Gains Deduction 
Preferential treatment for long-term capital gains was intro-
duced as part of the Revenue Act of 1921 based on the belief that 
sales of capital assets had been deterred because the gain was 
taxed at a high marginal rate. IS Congress reasoned that lowering 
the rate of tax on capital gains would stimulate realization of gains 
and, thereby, increase revenues. I9 
The notion that capital assets should be held for a period of time 
in order to qualify for preferential tax treatment was essentially an 
afterthought. During discussion of the Revenue Act of 1921, Sena-
tor Walsh of Massachusetts objected to a version of the Revenue 
Act which would have extended preferential treatment to all capi-
tal gains; On the Senate floor he proposed an amendment which 
would require that capital assets be held for three years in order to 
13 Indeed, it has been suggested that despite the many attempts to define speculation in 
the literature, "a satisfactory general definition is still not available and probably never will 
be." Hart & Kreps, Price Destabilizing Speculation, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 927, 928 (1986) . 
.. See S. Cottle, R. Murray & F. Block, Graham and Dodds Security Analysis 544-45 
(1988) . 
• 5 Hart & Kreps, supra note 13, at 928 . 
• 6 See R. Pickett & M. Ketchum, Investment Principles and Policy 20 (1954). See also 
Fredland, Gray & Sunley, The Six Month Holding Period for Capital Gains: An Empirical 
Analysis of Its Effect on the Timing of Gains, 21 Nat'l Tax J. 467, 474 (1968); D. Marting, 
Alternative Approaches to Capital Gains Taxation 28, 29 (Brooking Inst. 1968) . 
• 7 See infra notes 20, 36-38 and accompanying text (rationales of holding period require-
ments for capital gains deduction and the "short-short" rule). 
'8 See H.R. Rep. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (2) C.B. 
168. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1388, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 1, 2 (1923) (capital gains preference 
provided in order to encourage realization of gains and, thereby, increase revenues) . 
• 9 See H.R. Rep. No. 350, supra note 18. Interestingly, the debate about the revenue im-
pact of the capital gains deduction continues today. See, e.g., Minarik, The New Treasury 
Capital Gains Study: What Is In the Black Box?, 39 Tax Notes 1465 (June 20, 1988). 
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qualify for the preferential treatment. He argued that without the 
holding period, no distinction would be made between increases in 
value extending over a long period of time and "that sudden and 
speculative increase that develops within a short period of time. "20 
Although Senator Walsh initially requested a three-year holding 
period, a compromise resulted in a two year holding period. 
The idea that the holding period requirement should be retained 
in order to discourage speculation continued to influence legisla-
tive review of the holding period requirement up to the repeal of 
the preferential treatment for long-term capital gain in 1986. How-
ever, the desirability of a holding period requirement constantly 
clashed with concerns about the efficient operation of the stock 
market.21 In 1942, Congress considered enacting the controversial 
•• 61 Congo Rec. 6575-76 (1921). In explaining the rationale for his proposal, Senator 
Walsh stated: 
There is no distinction made between increased value in tangible or intangible prop-
erty extending over a long period of years and that sudden and speculative increase 
that develops within a short period of time. Under this amendment the stock specula-
tor who buys early in the year stocks at a small valuation and sells them later at a 
much enhanced value would have to pay a tax on only 40 per cent of the gain on such 
sales, while gains in income from every other source of income would be taxed to the 
full amount. 
Under the proposed amendment and bill a lawyer or any other professional man 
who derived as a fee from a large case or a merchant who through a substantial in-
crease in sales derived an income of, say, $100,000 per year is taxable on the full 
amount of income. The speculator who derives an income of $100,000 a year upon the 
New York Stock Exchange or in any other manner would be taxable only on 40 per 
cent of his net income or $40,000. 
If there is any merit at all in the contentions made by those who are in favor of this 
amendment it seems to me in all fairness and equity to taxpayers other than those 
who are making money in a speculative way upon sudden increases in the value of 
property which they hold that there should be a limit in the time allowed for holding 
capital assets before the reduced rate of taxation would be applicable. I suggest a 
time limit of at least three years. . 
Id. For an excellent survey of the legislative history of the treatment of capital gains, see 
Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains under the Federal Income Tax, 
1913-1948, 2 Nat'l Tax J. 12 (1949). See also Mayhall, Capital Gains Taxation-The First 
One Hundred Years, 41 La. L. Rev. 81, 87-92 (1980) (summarizing the historical develop-
ment of the capital gains deduction) . 
.. Early critics of the holding period requirement argued that the holding period require-
ment adversely impacted securities markets. The Subcommittee on Tax Avoidance of the 
Committee on Ways and Means reported in 1933 that the two-year holding period require-
ment may have contributed to the rise and subsequent precipitous fall of the stock market 
because it caused taxpayers to accelerate recognition of their losses within the two-year pe-
riod and postpone recognition of their gains until after the period. See Staff of Subcomm. 
on Tax Avoidance of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Prelim i-
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nary Report on Prevention of Tax Avoidance Relative to Methods of Preventing the Avoid-
ance and Erosion of the Internal Revenue Laws Together with Suggestions for the Simplifi-
cation and Improvement Thereof 5 (Comm. Print 1933). Moreover, persons opposed to any 
tax on capital gains argued to the Subcommittee that the imposition of the tax delayed sales 
of appreciated property and, therefore, promoted "the conditions which prevailed in 1929" 
(i.e. the stock market crash). Staff of Subcomm. on Tax Avoidance of the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Statement of the Acting Sec'y of the Treas. Regard-
ing the Preliminary Report of a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Ways and Means Relative to 
Methods of Preventing the Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue Laws Together 
with Suggestions for the Simplification and Improvement Thereof 4-5 (Comm. Print 1933). 
Opponents of taxing capital gains also argued that because the gains had accrued over sev-
eral years, it was unfair to tax the gains at progressive rates in the year in which they were 
recognized. See id. at 4. 
Rather than permit capital gains to avoid tax entirely, the Subcommittee proposed that 
the assessed tax diminish with the period of time for which the asset was held. One-hundred 
percent of the gain would be taxed if the asset was held for less than one year, while only 
twenty percent of the gain would be taxed if the asset was held for more than five years. 
Although the Treasury criticized the Subcommittee's five-year graduated scale as actually 
increasing the incentive to delay sales of capital assets in order to minimize the tax, see 
Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1934 before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1934), Congress enacted the Subcommittee's graduated scale in a 
modified form. The Revenue Act of 1934 provided for the taxation of capital assets in the 
following manner: 
Period Assets Held 
Percentage of 
Gain Included in 
Ordinary Income 
l~m~ ~ 
Over 1 year but not over 2 years 80 
Over 2 years but not over 5 years 60 
Over 5 years but not over 10 years 40 
Over 10 years 30 
Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 714 (1934). 
By 1938, the Subcommittee had itself begun to wonder whether the graduated scale with 
its sharp decreases in tax encouraged taxpayers to accelerate the recognition of losses and 
postpone the recognition of gains. The Subcommittee began its analysis by asserting that 
the bulk of stock transactions were insensitive to capital-gains taxation because stock was 
generally held in order to control the corporation or to obtain income. See Proposed Revi-
sion of the Revenue Laws, 1938, Report of a Subcomm. on Taxation of the House Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 32 (1938). The Subcommittee further asserted that a 
large percentage of the trading volume of stock not held for that purpose was attributable to 
short-term traders, such as exchange members, who are similarly insensitive to the capital 
gains tax. See id. The Report noted that twenty-four percent of all shares bought and sold 
on the New York Stock Exchange during a twenty-five-week period was for the accounts of 
members of that Exchange. See id. Despite this effort to diminish the impact of the taxation 
of capital gains on the securities markets, the Subcommittee Report recognized, however, 
that "[w]hatever the exact influence of the capital-gains-tax factor may be in the capital 
markets, the effect is accentuated, under the existing law, by the wide spread in the step-
down percentages from statutory period to statutory period a.:cording to the number of 
years that assets are held." Id. The Report concluded that the "larger the tax advantage of 
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Boland Bill,22 which proposed that the holding period requirement 
be eliminated. The Treasury opposed the bill on grounds of fair-
ness to other taxpayers,· arguing that the bill would place a "pre-
mium on speculation as a way of securing a living. "23 Proponents 
of the bill, on the other hand, asserted that elimination of the 
holding period would restore stability to the securities markets by 
removing the artificial incentive to realize short-term losses and 
delay long-term gains.2• This artificial incentive arose from the fact 
that long-term gains were taxed at a preferential rate while short-
term losses were deductible from ordinary income. Proponents also 
argued that speculation was not an evil to be avoided, but actually 
contributed to the smooth operation of the securities markets.211 
Although Congress did not eliminate the holding period, it re-
duced it to six months. The Senate Finance Committee Report 
stated that reducing the holding period would encourage the reali-
zation of capital gains and as a result, provide additional revenue.26 
Moreover, the Report stated that a holding period of six months 
retaining assets until the next step-down barrier is crossed the more likely is the tax consid-
eration to be an obstacle to the free flow of capital transactions." Id. 
Consequently, the Subcommittee recommended that preferential treatment for taxable 
gains apply to the sale or exchange of assets held for over one year using a graduated scale 
which would reduce the income taxed by a certain percentage for each month over one year 
that the asset was held. 
The Senate Finance Committee rejected this proposal as "excessively complicated." S. 
Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938). The Senate Finance Committee noted, how-
ever, that adjustments were needed. The Finance Committee Report stated: 
... [Aln excessive tax on capital gains freezes transactions and prevents the free flow 
of capital into productive investments. The effect of the present system of taxing 
capital gains is to prevent any individual with substantial capital from investing in 
new enterprises. This is most unfortunate, because it adversely affects the employ-
ment situation. 
Id. The Committee proposed a system substantially similar to that which had been in effect 
from 1924 to 1932-that preferential treatment be applied to assets held for longer than 
eighteen months. As ultimately enacted, however, the Act retained two classes of long-term 
assets-assets held longer than eighteen months but not longer than 24 months and assets 
held longer than 24 months. 
II H.R. 6358, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 88 Congo Rec. 290 (1942) . 
.. See Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 253 (1942) (statement of Randolph E. Paul, Special Tax Advisor to the Secretary of 
the Treasury) . 
•• See id. at 943 (statement of Elisha M. Friedman) . 
•• See id. at 958 (statement of Elisha M. Friedman); Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the 
Senate Comm. on Finance, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1187 (1942) (testimony of Emil Schram, 
President of the New York Stock Exchange) . 
•• See S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1942). 
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would be "a sufficient deterrent to the speculator as contrasted 
with the legitimate investor."27 
The six-month holding period remained in effect until the Tax 
Reform Act of 1976. At that time, it was argued that one of the 
reasons for the preferential treatment of long-term capital gains 
was that it was unfair to tax income which had accrued over a long 
period of time under a system that applied a progressive rate of 
taxation.28 However, it was asserted that the unfairness associated 
with the bunching of this income into one year was not present in 
the case of an asset held for only six months and, indeed, that 
other forms of income earned or realized within a twelve-month 
period were treated as ordinary income.29 Consequently, Congress 
decided to increase the holding period to one year. 
However, in 1984, Congress again reduced the holding period to 
six months. Congress enacted the reduction in part to mitigate the 
negative impact on market efficiency. The Report of the Senate 
Finance Committee stated that the reduction was effected in order 
to reduce the incentive for taxpayers to defer the sale of securities 
with gains and the resulting "adverse impact on capital market 
efficiency. "30 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the capital gains prefer-
ence. The Report of the Senate Finance Committee explained that 
the reduction of individual tax rates eliminated "the need to pro-
27 Id. 
In 1950, Congress again considered reducing the holding period from six months to three 
months. Interestingly, the House and Senate reports noted that holding period requirements 
contribute to the inflation of stock prices in a rising market. H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 
2d. Sess. 60, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 425; S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Congo 55-56, 2d Sess., 
reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 523-24. The House Report stated: 
A long holding period has a disturbing effect on prices in the markets for capital 
assets, which is most unfortunate. When prices rise, as has been the case in the secur-
ity markets during recent months, sales that would otherwise have occurred do not 
take place because the owners of the assets desire to hold them until they can qualify 
the gain as long-term and obtain the resulting tax benefits. The consequence is that a 
check on the price movement which would otherwise appear is missing. 
H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 60, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 425. 2. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 at 426 (Comm. Print 1976). 2. See id. See also Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Tax Revision 
Issues - 1976 (H.R. 10612), 8 Cap. Gains & Losses 2-3 (Comm. Print 1976). 
O. Staff of Senate Finance Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
Explanation of Provision Approved by the Comm. on Mar. 21, i984, Vol. I at 819 (Comm. 
Print 1984). 
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vide a reduced rate for net capital gain[s] .... "31 
The Report also stated: 
This will result in a tremendous amount of simplification for many 
taxpayers since their tax will no longer depend upon the character-
ization of income as ordinary or capital gain. In addition, this will 
eliminate any requirement that capital assets be held by the tax-
payer for any extended period of time (currently 6 months) in or-
der to obtain favorable treatment. 32 
B. The "Short-Short" Rule 
A holding period requirement separate from the long-term capi-
tal gains preference is imposed on mutual funds pursuant to sec-
tion 851(b)(3) of the Code. In order for a mutual fund to maintain 
its special tax status as a flow-through entity, section 851(b)(3) re-
quires that less than thirty percent of its gross income be derived 
from the sale or other disposition of stock or securities held for less 
than three months. This requirement, frequently referred to as the 
"short-short" rule, first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1936.33 
When first enacted, the rule required that less than thirty percent 
of its gross income be derived from dispositions of stocks or securi-
ties held for less than six months.34 This requirement was amended 
in 1942 to reduce the holding period requirement to three 
months. 311 
Interestingly, the enactment of the short-short rule in the Reve-
nue Act of 1936 occurred without discussion on the floor or in the 
committee reports. When the period for which the stock and secur-
ities must be held was reduced from six months to three months 
there was again no discussion. Consequently, it is difficult to deter-
mine the initial legislative purpose for the holding period require-
ment, but post hoc rationales have been offered by the Internal 
Revenue Service ("Service") and by Congress. 
The Service has suggested that the short-short rule was adopted 
31 S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1986). 
32 Id. 
33 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, 1669 (1936) (Section 48(e), Definition of 
Mutual Investment Companies). 
34 Id. 
3. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 170, 56 Stat. 798, 878 (Section 361, "Supplement 
Q-Regulated Investment Companies"). 
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"to ensure that regulated investment companies [i.e. mutual funds] 
engage primarily in safeguarding investments and securing invest-
ment returns consistent with safety of principal."36 The Service 
elaborated that "[c]ompanies actively trading securities for the 
purpose of making short-term trading profits" were intended to be 
denied flow-through treatment. 37 
Later, Congress, considering in 1986 whether it should repeal the 
short-short rule in section 851(b)(3), offered an additional ration-
ale in the Conference Committee report: 
The conferees believe that the requirement that a RIC [regulated 
investment company] derive less than 30 percent of its gross in-
come from the sale or other disposition of stock or securities held 
for less than three months is an appropriate requirement to ensure 
that a RIC is a passive entity that is appropriately granted pass-
through status.38 
III. SPECULATION AND STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY 
A. Speculation 
While the legislative history of the capital gains preference and 
the short-short rule indicates that one of the principal goals of im-
posing a holding period requirement was to discourage speculation 
in the form of short-term trading, no conclusive evidence exists 
that short-term trading is harmful. In particular, studies are incon-
clusive as to whether short-term trading contributes to stock mar-
ket volatility. 
A large amount of the economic literature has focused on the 
formulation of theoretical models pertaining to whether specula-
tors stabilize or destabilize prices.39 Milton Friedman sparked this 
inquiry in 1953 when he suggested that speculators should help 
stabilize prices because they buy when prices are low, thereby 
helping to raise low prices, and they sell when prices are high, 
S. Rev. Rul. 75-376, 1975-2 C.B. 267, 268. See Rev. Rul. 75·225, 1975-1 C.B. 191. 
37 Rev. Rul. 75-376, 1975-2 C.B. 267, 268 . 
.. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. II, at II-245 (1986). 
S. See, e.g., M. Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics 175 (1953); Baumol, Speculation, 
Profitability, and Stability, 39 Rev. Econ. Statistics 263 (1957); Danthine, Information, Fu-
tures Prices, and Stabilizing Speculation, 17 J. Econ. Theory 79 (1978); Hart & Kreps, Price 
Destabilizing Speculation, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 927, 927 (1986); Tumovsky, The Determination 
of Spot and Future Prices with Storable Commodities, 51 Econometrica 1363, 1364 (1983). 
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thereby helping to lower high prices. He stated that "[p]eople who 
argue that speculation is generally destabilizing seldom realize that 
this is largely equivalent to saying that speculators lose money, 
since speculation can be destabilizing in general only if speculators 
on the average sell when the currency is low in price and buy when 
it is high."40 
Although Friedman's suggestion that speculators should stabilize 
prices has been confirmed by several mathematical models,41 some 
mathematical models have also shown that rational speculators can 
destabilize prices.42 Underlying the latter studies is the notion that 
speculators will buy when the probability of profit is high, and that 
this may occur when prices are already at high level. 43 In those 
instances, the speculators' actions can result in price destabiliza-
tion as prices are pushed higher and then collapse." However, 
most of these latter studies rely on the presence of conditions that 
may not be realistic-the existence of a small number of imper-
fectly competitive speculators or consumers having irrational ex-
pectations.411 Thus, the studies cannot be viewed as conclusive as to 
whether speculation increases or decreases market volatility.46 
•• M. Friedman, supra note 39, at 175 . 
.. See e.g., Peck, Futures Market, Supply Response and Price Stability, 90 Q.J. Econ. 407, 
422 (1976); Turnovsky, Futures Markets, Private Storage, and Price Stabilization, 12 J. Pub. 
Econ. 301, 312 (1979); Turnovsky, supra note 39, at 1364; Turnovsky & Campbell, The Sta-
bilizing and Welfare Properties of Futures Markets: A Simulation Approach, 26 Int'l Econ. 
Rev. 277, 297-98 (1985) (the introduction of a futures market may yield a high degree of 
stabilization, and, at worst, produces no destabilizing effect) . 
•• See, e.g., Baumol, supra note 39, at 263-64; Farrell, Profitable Speculation, 33 Econom-
ics 183, 183-93 (May 1968); Hart & Kreps, supra note 39, at 930; Kohn, Competitive Specu-
lation, 46 Econometrica 1061, 1074-75 (1978); Stein, Informational Externalities and Wel-
fare-reducing Speculation, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 1123, 1123-25 (1987) . 
•• See Baumol, supra note 39, at 263-64; Farrell, supra note 42, at 183-93; Hart & Kreps, 
supra note 39, at 928, Kohn, supra note 42, at 1075 . 
•• See id . 
•• See Hart & Kreps, supra note 39, at 928. See also Telser, Theory of Speculation Relat-
ing Profitability and Stability, 41 Rev. Econ. Statistics 295, 299-301 (1959) (critiquing 
Baumol, supra note 39) . 
•• It should be noted, however, that if irrational speculators are somehow able to influ-
ence market prices, speculation could destabilize prices because market prices might reflect 
the speculators' emotional reactions to new information or might be affected by the "herd" 
instinct, rather than rational analysis. See infra notes 133-141 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, it is possible that rational speculators could help destabilize prices if rational 
speculative bubbles occur. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor 
Jeremy C. Stein has suggested that regardless of whether rational speculative bubbles occur, 
speculators may increase the volatility of prices simply because they bring additional infor-
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B. The Impact of Stock Index Future Contracts on Stock 
Market Volatility 
Another approach to analyzing the impact of speculation on 
stock market volatility has been to examine the impact of stock 
index futures contracts." Several studies of stock market volatility 
have focused on the impact of stock index future contracts on mar-
ket volatility because of a concern that such futures contracts may 
have fueled excessive speculation.48 Indeed, it has been asserted 
that "opening a futures market is exactly equivalent to allowing 
mation to the market place. See Stein, supra note 42, at 1141·42 . 
• 7 A futures contract obligates the holder to either buy or sell an asset at a set price on a 
specified date. The futures contract may be bought or sold up to the time the contract 
expires. The value of the futures contract will depend upon the value of the asset upon 
which the contract is based. For example, the value of a contract which obligates the buyer 
to purchase gold at $350 per ounce will increase if gold prices rise to $400 per ounce. If on 
the date the futures contract expires, gold is selling at $400 per ounce, the holder will be 
obligated to buy the gold at $350 but can then sell it at the prevailing price of $400. Rather 
than taking actual delivery of the asset, in reality, most contracts are settled by making cash 
payments equal to increases or decreases in the value of the asset underlying the futures 
contract. Indeed, futures contracts based on stock indices avoid entirely the requirement 
that delivery of the stocks be made. 
A stock index futures contract is a futures contract whose value depends upon the value 
of the stocks which comprise the stock index upon which the futures contract is based. For 
example, an S&P 500 futures contract is a contract whose value is determined by reference 
to the S&P 500 Index. If the Index goes up, the S&P futures contract increases in value. 
Conversely, if the Index goes down, the futures contract decreases in value. On the expira-
tion date of the futures contract, the parties to the contract settle the contract by taking 
into account the final price of the Index. The purchaser of the futures contract will receive 
cash from the seller if the S&P 500 Index is greater than the price designated in the futures 
contract, or will pay cash to the seller if the Index is below the price designated in the 
futures contract. See generally R. Brealey & S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 614-
18 (3d ed. 1988) (describing futures contracts) . 
•• See e.g., R. Britto, Futures Trading and the Level and Volatility of Spot Prices: A 
Survey at 1 (Colum. U. Center for the Study of Future Markets Working Papers Series 
#CSFM-112, Oct. 1985) ("It is hardly necessary to point out that it is the presence of specu-
lators in futures trading that provokes hostile reactions to such trading .... "); Edwards, 
supra note 8, at 65-66 ("The loudest and most persistent criticism of futures trading in 
equity index products has been that such activity increases the volatility of cash stock 
prices."); Edwards, Futures Trading and Cash Market Volatility: Stock Index and Interest 
Rate Futures, 8 J. Futures Mkts. 421, 422 (1988). 
The major reason that stock index futures are viewed as speculative instruments is that a 
futures trader can take a larger position with a commitment of less capital than in the 
stocks which comprise the applicable stock index. See Gould, Stock Index Futures: The 
Arbitrage Cycle and Portfolio Insurance, 44 Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 48, 54. As a 
result, futures contracts facilitate short-term trading. 
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more speculators to participate" in the stock market.ol9 
Studies that have analyzed the relationship of stock index fu-
tures and stock market volatility initially seem to support Fried-
man's argument that speculation stabilizes prices. Commentators 
have noted that stock market volatility actually decreased in 1982 
when trading in stock index futures commenced and continued to 
remain below the pre-futures contract level until the latter half of 
1986.60 However, a Staff Study by the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and other studies have found that stock 
market volatility increased significantly in 1986 and early 1987.51 
While the Staff Study could not conclusively identify the cause of 
the increase in volatility, the study suggested that "macroeconomic 
conditions" are "relatively important in explaining changes in 
share-price volatility .... "52 In particular, the Study noted that a 
direct correlation between changes in the growth of industrial pro-
duction and volatility in stock prices existed. 53 Another study has 
concluded that although no clear explanation existed to explain 
the recent rise in stock market volatility, it seemed unlikely that 
futures contracts were the primary cause. 54 
Speculation in stock index futures may contribute to stock mar-
ket volatility in at least three ways. 55 First, arbitrage between stock 
•• Stein, Informational Externalities and Welfare Reducing Speculation, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 
1123, 1125-26 (1987) . 
•• See Edwards, supra note 8, at 63-68. Studies of the volatility of bond prices after the 
introduction of financial futures contracts also suggest that the introduction of financial 
futures did not increase bond market volatility. See Edwards, Futures Trading and Cash 
Market Volatility: Stock Index and Interest Rate Futures, supra note 48, at 433. See also 
Simpson & Ireland, The Impact of Financial Futures on the Cash Market for Treasury Bills, 
20 J. Fin. Quantitative Analysis 371, 371-79 (1985); Moriarity & Tosini, Futures Trading 
and the Price Volatility of GNMA Certificates-Further Evidence, 5 J. Futures Mkts. 633, 
633-42 (1985). 
" See C. Davis & A. White, supra note 8, at 6-7; Biriny & Hanson, The New Worries 
about Stock-Price Volatility, 2 Morgan Econ. Q., Dec. 1986, at 18; Edwards, supra note 8, at 
67; The Role of Index-Related Trading in the Market Decline on September 11 and 12, 
1986, A Report by the Division of Market Regulation U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (March 1987) . 
• 2 C. Davis & A. White, supra note 8, at 13 . 
•• See id.; Chen, Roll & Ross, Economic Forces and the Stock Market, 59 J. Bus. 383, 386, 
395 (1986) . 
•• See Edwards, supra note 8, at 63-68 . 
•• See generally The Role of Index-Related Trading in the Market Decline on September 
11 and 12, 1986, supra note 51, at 19-25 (description of the potential impact of index arbi-
trage and manipulation on volatility). 
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index futures and the stocks that comprise the index upon which 
the futures contract is based may strain the ability of the stock 
market to absorb smoothly the large sales and purchases of stocks 
involved. Second, stock index futures may somehow directly move 
stock prices. Third, stock index futures may make it easier to ma-
nipulate stock prices. 
Arbitrage between stock index futures and stocks involves the 
simultaneous purchase and sale of stock index futures and the 
stocks which comprise the stock index in order to profit from price 
discrepancies between the two instruments. ~6 In a perfect world, 
any difference between the price of stock index futures and the 
underlying stocks would merely reflect differences in transaction 
costS.~7 However, because the markets possess some imperfections, 
price differences develop. Index arbitrageurs profit from the price 
differences by selling and buying stock index futures and large 
blocks of stock which comprise the stock index. ~8 
Index arbitrage can sometimes place significant strains on stock 
prices when the stock market is not sufficiently liquid, such as 
when there are insufficient buyers or sellers to implement 
smoothly the movement of large blocks of stock.~9 However, it has 
•• See O'Dea, Arbitrage, 2 Intermarket, May 1985, at 37, 37. See id. for a more detailed 
explanation of arbitrage techniques. 
07 See, e.g., Merrick, Volume Determination in Stock and Stock Index Futures Markets: 
An Analysis of Arbitrage and Volatility Effects, 7 J. Futures Mkts. 483, 483 (1987) (noting 
that price differences reflect inefficient markets) . 
•• For example, suppose that stock index futures for the S&P 500 are trading at 300 while 
the actual stocks which comprise the S&P 500 are trading at 295. An arbitrageur could 
make a profit by selling an S&P stock index future at 300 and purchase the stocks of the 
index at 295. The arbitrageur is guaranteed a profit of five regardless of what happens in 
the stock market because, at the time the futures contract expires, its price and the price of 
the S&P 500 must by definition be equal. Thus, if the futures contract expired when the 
S&P 500 was 310, the arbitrageur, as the seller of the contract, would be obligated to pay 
the buyer of the contract 10 (the difference between the amount the buyer paid for the 
contract, 300, and the expiration price, 310). However, the arbitrageur would have an offset-
ting gain of 15 because he or she could sell the stocks of the Index for 310 (sales price of 310 
minus cost of 295 equals 15). Accordingly, the arbitrageur's net profit would be 5 . 
•• See Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility 
of Program Trading and Dynamic Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275, 290-92 (1988). See 
also Stoll & Whaley, Program Trading and Expiration-Day Effects, 43 Fin. Analyst J., 
Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 16, 23-24 (the failure of market to provide sufficient liquidity can cause 
stock price volatility); Rendleman, Commentary on the Effects of Stock Index Futures 
Trading on the Market for Underlying Stocks, 5 Rev. Research in Futures Mkts. 174, 180-82 
(1986) (various trading techniques which involve futures contracts may contribute to stock 
market volatility). 
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been found in contexts not involving arbitrage that trading large 
blocks of stock have significant impact on the prices of the traded 
stocks because of liquidity strains.60 Thus, absent the failure in 
market liquidity (which may affect prices in a non-arbitrage con-
text as well), it is not clear that stock index arbitrage would con-
tribute to stock market volatility. 
Another way stock index futures contracts might contribute to 
stock market volatility is if changes in the prices of futures con-
tracts directly caused changes in the prices of stocks. Studies show 
that changes in stock index futures prices are normally followed by 
similar changes in stock prices.61 However, no causal connection 
has been conclusively proven.62 It may be that because the futures 
•• See, e.g., Holthausen & Leftwich, The Effect of Large Block Transactions on Security 
Prices, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 237, 237-38, 264-65 (1987); Kraus & Stoll, Price Impacts of Block 
Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. Fin. 569, 569-88 (1972); Easley & O'Hara, 
Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 69, 69-71 (1987). 
See also LaHarris & Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 
500 List: New Evidence for the Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. Fin. 815, 828-29 (1986) 
(increase in the volume of trading in stock results in increases of price volatility of the 
stock); Schleifer, Do Demand Curves For Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. Fin. 579, 588-89 (1986) 
(stocks have a downward sloping demand curve which results in price changes when large 
blocks are exchanged). Similarly, several authors have noted a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the total volume of trading and stock market volatility. See, e.g., Smirlock 
& Starks, A Further Examination of Stock Price Changes and Transaction Volume, 8 J. Fin. 
Research 217, 218-25 (1985); Kraus & Stoll, supra, at 587-88 . 
• , Herbst, McCormack, & West, Investigation of a Lead-Lag Relationship Between Spot 
Stock Indices and Their Futures Contracts, 7 J. Futures Mkts. 373, 379-80 (1987) (changes 
in stock index futures prices on average lead changes in stock prices by one minute); Kawal-
ler, Koch & Koch, The Temporal Price Relationship Between S&P 500 Futures and the 
S&P 500 Index, 42 J. Fin. 1309, 1327 (1987) (changes in stock index futures prices lead 
changes in stock prices by twenty to forty-five minutes); J. Merrick, Price Discovery in the 
Stock Market 9 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 87-4) (March 1987) 
(beginning in 1985, futures prices started to lead stock prices) . 
•• For an interesting exchange on the failure of studies to establish causation between 
changes in stock-index futures prices and stock prices, see Finnerty & Park, Stock Index 
Futures: Does the Tail Wag the Dog?, 43 Fin. Analysts J., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 57; Gordon, 
Moriarity & Tosini, Stock Index Futures: Does the Dog Wag the Tail?, 43 Fin. Analysts J., 
Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 72; Finnerty & Park, Does the Tail Wag the Dog: A Response to Com-
ments, 43 Fin. Analysts J., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 76. But see Bhattacharya, Ramjee & Balasub-
ramani, The Causal Relationship Between Futures Price Volatility and the Cash Price Vola-
tility of GNMA Securities, 6 J. Futures Mkts. 29, 32-33 (1986) (finding some evidence of 
weak causation between GNMA futures prices and GNMA bond prices). 
It has been hypothesized that stock index futures contracts did actually contribute to the 
fall of stock prices in' October 1987 because of their role in portfolio insurance. See, e.g., 
Pierog, Crash Prompts New Look to Portfolio Insurance, 17 Futures, Feb. 1988, at 44. See 
also Grossman, An Analysis of the Implications for Stock and Futures Price Volatility of 
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market has a larger volume of transactions and lower transaction 
costs, the futures market is simply a faster calculator of what stock 
prices will be in the near future. 63 On the other hand, because 
prices at which speculators are willing to buy or sell stock index 
futures may provide additional information to the stock market, it 
is possible that speculation in stock index futures causes prices to 
change in the stock market because it communicates new informa-
tion to the stock market.64 
Program Trading and Dynamics Hedging Strategies, 61 J. Bus. 275,278 (1988) (volatility of 
stock market may increase by virtue of portfolio insurance because the market cannot ascer-
tain the amount of portfolio insurance programs in place). Portfolio insurance involves sell-
ing stock index futures after the market has begun to fall. See, e.g., Tosini, Stock Index 
Futures and Stock Market Activity in October 1987, 44 Fin. Analysts J., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 
28, 31; Report of the Presidential Task Force On Market Mechanism, supra note 2, at 7. If 
the market continues to fall, the investor's position in the stock index futures will increase 
in value, offsetting any further decrease in the value of the stock portfolio. 
The problem with portfolio insurance, however, is that in a falling market stock index 
futures can usually be sold only at a discount to the value of the basket of stocks which 
comprise the index upon which the futures are based. Indeed, many pension funds have 
abandoned the use of portfolio insurance techniques after the crash because the fact that 
they were required to sell the index futures contracts at prices below the level of the corre-
sponding index made the method prohibitively expensive. See Pierog, supra, at 44. See also 
McMurray, Pit Fall, Financial Futures Sink Into a Volume Slump, Hurting Chicago Marts, 
Wall St. J., Jul. 1, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (institutional investors had withdrawn up to $20 billion 
from the futures market since October 19 and an additional $70 billion is no longer covered 
by portfolio insurance). If the discount is large enough, arbitrageurs can lock-in an immedi-
ate profit by purchasing the futures contracts at a discount and at the same time selling a 
basket of stocks that are identical to the stocks which comprise the index. Easy Riders, The 
Economist, Nov. 8, 1986, at 70, 71-72. This process can place downward pressure on stock 
prices if several arbitrageurs are selling stocks into an already falling market. Indeed, the 
SEC Staff Report identified the activity of arbitrageurs as a factor contributing to the rapid 
decline of stock prices. The October 1987 Market Break, SEC Staff Study at 3-11 to 3-12, 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1271, Feb. 9, 1988. Moreover, if portfolio insurers are seeking 
to sell a large volume of index futures, this can further depress the price of stock index 
futures triggering another wave of arbitrage activity, which can further decrease stock prices 
and perhaps trigger another wave of portfolio insurance selling. The portfolio insurance sell-
ing could cause another significant discount to develop, starting the cycle again. This so-
called "cascade scenario" was also identified by the SEC as contributing to the rapid price 
decline in October. See id. at 3-11 n.39. 
63 See Garcia, Leuthold & Zapata, Lead-Lag Relationship Between Trading Volume and 
Price Variability: New Evidence, 6 J. Futures Mkts. 1,3 (1986) (because the futures markets 
have more traders, prices of futures contracts reflect more information); Herbst, McCor-
mack & West, supra note 61, at 375 (because it is easier to buy a stock index future than the 
stocks which comprise the index, it might be expected a priori that futures prices will fore-
cast stock prices); Merrick, supra note 61, at 9 (ability of futures market to predict stock 
price changes arose at a time that volume of trading in futures market exceeded volume of 
trading in stock market). 
6. See Stein, supra note 42, at 1141-42 (in certain circumstances, information contained in 
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Lastly, it has been asserted that stock index futures contracts 
might also contribute to volatility because they provide an oppor-
tunity for market manipulation.611 It has long been recognized that 
futures contracts can be used to manipulate· market prices of the 
item on which the contract is based.66 However, manipulation 
would exist regardless of whether speculation occurred. In the case 
of market manipulation, the volatility does not necessarily resuit 
from speculation, but rather from a failure of the regulatory sys-
tem to prevent manipulation.67 
In summary, no clear evidence exists that speculation contrib-
utes to stock market volatility. Studies which attempt to model the 
relationship between speculation and market volatility are incon-
clusive. Studies of the impact of stock index futures contracts, 
which are viewed as playing a major role in speculation, show that 
after the introduction of such contracts, stock market volatility ac-
tually decreased through the first half of 1986. Beginning in the 
latter half of 1986, market volatility increased. It is not clear 
whether speculation with stock futures contracts contributed to 
this increased volatility. 
C. Repeal of the Capital Gains Preference and Market 
Volatility 
The findings that stock market volatility increased for the latter 
half of 1986 and for 1987 suggest that one potential cause for the 
futures prices can destabilize prices). For articles which have generally analyzed the infor-
mation content of prices, see, e.g., Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Information-
ally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980); Helwig, On the Aggregation of Infor-
mation in Competitive Markets, 22 J. Econ. Theory 477 (1980); Grossman, The Existence of 
Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities, .44 Rev. 
Econ. Stud. 431 (1977) . 
• 0 See Wallace, Program Trading Gets More Brutal, N.Y. Times, May I, 1988, § 3 (Busi-
ness), at 3, 23 (some investors charge that institutions have used stock index futures to drive 
prices down) . 
•• See, e.g., Greenstone, The Coffee Cartel: Manipulation in the Public Interest, J. Fu-
tures Mkts. 3, 3-16 (1981) (manipulation of coffee market); Helmuth, A Report on the Sys-
tematic Downward Bias in Live Cattle Prices, 1 J. Futures Mkts. 347,347-58 (1981) (manip-
ulation of cattle market). 
For an excellent survey of the literature pertaining to the use of futures contracts to ma-
nipulate markets, see R. Britto, supra note 48. 
67 For an interesting article which discusses the regulation of manipulation by use of com-
modities contracts, see Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 
56 Fordham L. Rev. 345 (1987). 
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increase in volatility has been the repeal of the preference for long-
term capital gains and its concomitant holding period requirement. 
The preference for long-term capital gains was repealed in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 and applied, in general, to stock purchased on 
or after July 1, 1986.68 After the repeal of the preference, there was 
no incentive to hold stock for six months. It is possible, therefore, 
that the increase in stock market volatility is related to the repeal. 
There are, however, no statistical studies which have looked for a 
correlation between the repeal of the capital gains deduction and 
market volatility. Moreover, such studies would have to be scruti-
nized because the other massive changes implemented by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 could by themselves contribute substantially 
to volatility.69 The rational expectations theory suggests that after 
a policy is changed, it may initially be difficult for individuals to 
forecast economic variables, and, as a result, they may make crude 
guesses.70 This could result in a chaotic period immediately follow-
ing a policy change which would eventually dissipate. It is possible, 
therefore, that the policy shifts encompassed in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 have contributed to market volatility, if at all, for the 
short term, not the long term. Moreover, other macroeconomic fac-
tors may have also played a major role in the recent increase in 
stock market volatility.71 
.S See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301(c), 1986 U.S. Code Congo & 
Admin. News (100 Stat.) 2216, 2218 . 
•• For a laundry list of the major changes to the Code made by the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, see J. Eustice, J. Kuntz, C. Lewis & T. Deering, The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Analysis 
and Commentary 1-7 to 1-8 (1987). The authors clearly viewed the scope of the changes as 
immense: 
The Internal Revenue Code (lRC) of 1954 was easily the largest, most comprehensive, 
and most significant piece of technical tax legislation ever enacted by Congress. More 
than three decades later, however, we are faced with yet another gargantuan legisla-
tive product, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which overshadows the 1954 legislation in 
its scope, significance, and complexity, and clearly outstrips other major code revi-
sions . . . in the intervening years . . . . 
Id. at 1-1 to 1-2. 
70 See Shiller, Rational Expectations and the Dynamic Structure of Macroeconomic Mod-
els, 4 J. Monetary Econ. 1, 3-4 (1978). 
71 See Chen, Roll & Ross, supra note 53, at 386, 395 (macroeconomic conditions, including 
the growth rate in industrial production and unexpected inflation, are important in explain-
ing changes in share-price volatility); Davis & White, supra note 8, at 13 (direct correlation 
exists between changes in growth of industrial production and volatility in stock prices). 
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IV. RATIONAL EFFICIENT MARKETS, HOLDING PERIOD 
REQUIREMENTS, AND SOCIETAL WELFARE 
Even if one could decisively determine that speculation increases 
market volatility, that determination is not dispositive of the issue 
whether speculation should be curbed. Instead, the dispositive is-
sue is whether speculation reduces or enhances societal welfare.72 If 
speculation reduces societal welfare, society should appropriately 
seek to curb speculation. However, holding period requirements 
are not an appropriate method to discourage speculation because 
they also reduce societal welfare. 
A. Speculation and Societal Welfare 
The important question whether speculation decreases societal 
welfare has not been adequately answered. As two prominent com-
mentators have recently stated, "Welfare considerations [of specu-
lation] are difficult and they may bear no particular relationship to 
the stability or instability of prices."73 Although models have been 
developed which show that speculation can maximize societal wel-
fare regardless of whether the speculation has stabilized or destabi-
lized the price structure of the market,74 the' models include as-
sumptions which may not reflect the real world, and, consequently 
cannot be viewed as conclusive.76 In particular, those models as-
sume that investors are risk neutral, rather than risk averse.76 
Another way to analyze the problem is to ask, assuming specula-
tion contributes to the volatility of stock prices, does that volatility 
represent the variance of the stock prices from their "fundamen-
tal" values? For purposes of this article, the fundamental value of 
72 See Hart & Kreps, supra note 13, at 930. The authors stated: 
Id. 
It should ... be noted that whether or not speculation stabilizes prices is in some 
sense the wrong question. One really ought to be interested in the welfare implica-
tions of speculation. One may feel intuitively that price stabilization is "good,:' but, if 
so, one's intuition is faulty .... 
7. Id. at 935. 
7' See, e.g., id. at 947; Samuelson, Stochastic Speculation Price, 68 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci., 
Feb. 1971, at 335, 335-37; Scheinkman & Schectman, A Simple Competitive Model with 
Production and Storage, 50 Rev. Econ. Stud. 427, 427-41 (1983). 
70 See Hart & Kreps, supra note 13, at 947. See also Stein, Informational Externalities 
and Welfare-Reducing Speculation, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 1123, 1141-42 (1987) (under certain cir-
cumstances, speculation decreases societal welfare). 
7. See id. 
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a security is the price which would be established in a rationally 
efficient market. In such a market, prices are determined in a man-
ner which equates the marginal rates of return (adjusted for risk) 
of all producers and savers.77 Thus, scarce savings are optimally 
allocated to productive investments in a way which helps maximize 
societal welfare.7s If speculation somehow causes stock prices to 
vary from their fundamental values, then societal welfare is dimin-
ished because society is misallocating its resources. 
The efficient market theory states that a rationally efficient 
market exists where there are a large number of buyers and sellers 
acting through a market mechanism, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange.79 There are two critical elements of the efficient market 
theory. One is that the stock market assimilates all information 
quickly so the market price of securities reflects all publicly availa-
ble information. so The second aspect is that the market rationally 
interprets this information with the result that the market price 
represents an accurate reflection of the fundamental value of the 
security.s1 
The rational element of the efficient market theory is based on 
the notion that investors and stock analysts scrutinize prices in an 
77 See T. Copeland & J. Weston, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 285-86 (2d ed. 
1983); W. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency at viii (1965); Fischel, Effi-
cient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash 
Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1978). 
78 See Copeland & Weston, supra note 77, at 286. 
7. See R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 47, at 281-82; T. Copeland & J. Weston, supra 
note 77, at 286-87; J. Lorie, P. Dodd & M. Kimpton, Stock Market Theories and Evidence 
55-56 (2d. ed. 1985); Fischel, supra note 77, at 3-4. For a discussion referring to recent stud-
ies suggesting that the stock market may not be very efficient and discussing the implica-
tions for investment strategy, see Keane, The Efficient Market Hypothesis on Trial, 42 Fin. 
Analysts J., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 58. Several studies which confirm or reject the efficient mar-
ket theory are summarized in V. Brudney & M. Chirelstein, Corporate Finance Cases and 
Materials, 123-30 (3d ed. 1987); J. Lorie, P. Dodd & M. Kimpton, supra, at 56-77; Gordon & 
Korn~auser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.V. L. 
Rev. 761, 834-46 (1985); Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental 
Values?, 41 J. Fin. 591 (1986); Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market is not Effi-
cient, 19 V.Cal. Davis L. Rev. 341, 349-62 (1986). 
80 See R. Brealey & S. Myers, supra note 47, at 281-82. See also Tobin, On the Efficiency 
of the Financial System, 153 Lloyds Bank Rev., July 1984, at 1, 5 (distinguishing the effi-
ciency of the market in assimilating public information from the issue whether the market 
price for a security reflects its fundamental value); Wang, supra note 79, at 344. 
81 See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 79, at 828-29; Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too 
Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 421, 424 
(1981). 
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effort to find underpriced or overpriced securities.82 In such a com-
petitive environment, investors would quickly identify a stock 
price which varied from its fundamental value and, as a result, the 
price discrepancy would quickly disappear.83 If the price of a stock 
were below its fundamental value, investors would quickly see the 
profit opportunity, purchase the stock, and as a result of this in-
creased demand, drive the stock price up to its fundamental value. 
If, on the other hand, a stock's price were above its fundamental 
value, investors would sell or engage in short sales84 of those 
stocks, and drive prices down to the stock's fundamental value. 
B. Benefits of a Rationally Efficient Market 
If the efficient market theory is correct, then there is little rea-
son to worry about the impact of speculation on stock market vola-
tility.8~ Market prices would always reflect the fundamental value 
of securities.86 Movements in market prices would simply represent 
the availability to the market of new information which the market 
had assimilated and reflected in a revised price.87 
The notion that stock prices reflect the fundamental values of 
stocks in a rationally efficient market is important because stock 
prices provide the mechanism for allocating capital among compet-
ing uses. Moreover, stock prices help in planning for capital forma-
tion. Lord Keynes recognized this phenomenon over fifty years ago 
when he stated: 
[T]he daily revaluations of the Stock Exchange, though they are 
.2 See Fischel, supra note 77, at 3-4 . 
• 3 See id. Compare Shiller, Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets in Knights, 
Raiders and Targets 56, 59 (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman, eds. 1988) (profit 
opportunity from mispricing may not be great enough to encourage investor response) . 
.. A short sale occurs when a person (the "short seller") borrows a security from its cur-
rent owner and then immediately sells the security at the current price in the open market. 
Later when the short seller is obligated to return the security to its owner, the short seller 
purchases the security in the open market at the current price and returns it to the owner. 
If the price of the security has fallen, the short seller makes a profit. See T. Copeland & J. 
Weston, supra note 77, at 115 . 
• & Assuming, of course, that no market manipulation is occurring . 
• 8 See Shiller, supra note 81, at 424-32. 
87 T. Copeland & J. Weston, supra note 77, at 286; F. Edwards, Financial Futures and 
Cash Market Volatility 5 (Colum. U. Center for the Study of Futures Markets Working 
Paper Series CFSM-#159) (June 1987); Edwards, Futures Trading and Cash Market Vola-
tility: Stock Index and Interest Rate Futures, supra note 48, at 422-23. 
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primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investments between 
one individual and another, inevitably exert a decisive influence on 
the rate of current investment. For there is no sense in building up 
a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which a similar ex-
isting enterprise can be purchased; whilst there is an inducement 
to spend on a new project what may seem an extravagant sum, if it 
can be floated off on the Stock Exchange at an immediate profit.88 
This recognition was incorporated by James Tobin into "Q" the-
ory which posits that the rate of investment for firms is deter-
mined "by the condition that the marginal cost for the firm of ad-
ding to its capital stock is equal to the price at which it can sell a 
weighted average package of equity and debt claims on that capi-
tal."89 In other words, firms invest in themselves as long as each 
dollar spent purchasing assets raises the market value of the firm 
by at least one dollar. For statistical research purposes "Q" has 
usually been calculated as the ratio of the stock plus bond-market 
valuations of firms to the estimated reproduction costs of their 
capital90 and has been found to be statistically significant in pre-
dicting the rate of investment.91 Thus, in a rationally efficient mar-
ket, stock prices aid the planning process by providing accurate 
and current valuations. 
c. Impact of Holding Period Requirements on a Rationally 
Efficient Market 
If the stock market actually behaves as predicted by the efficient 
market theory, holding period requirements distort the market by 
inducing persons to hold a security when real economic factors 
might dictate that they sell.92 As a result, stock prices could di-
•• J. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money 151 (1936) . 
•• Fischer & Merton, Macroeconomics and Finance: The Role of the Stock Market, in 21 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 57, 83 (1984). See Tobin & Brainard, 
Asset Prices and the Cost of Capital in Economic Progress, Private Value, and Public Policy 
235 (B. Balassa & R. Nelson, eds. 1977) . 
•• See Fischer & Merton, supra note 89, at 83 (citing Von Furstenberg, Corporate Invest-
ment: Does Market Valuation Matter in the Aggregate?, in 1977 Brookings Papers on Econ. 
Activity 347); Summers, Taxation and Corporate Investment: A Q-Theory Approach, in 
1981 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 67 . 
• , See Fischer & Merton, supra note 89, at 83-84. Fischer and Merton state, however, that 
although the Q ratio is usually statistically significant in predicting the rate of investment, 
"the empirical success of the Q theory is generally regarded as mixed." Id . 
•• See S. Kaplan, The Holding Period Distinction of the Capital Gains Tax (Nat'l Bureau 
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verge from the values which would be established in a nondistorted 
market since the supply of stocks would be diminished. A restric-
tion in supply, all other factors remaining the same, would cause 
an increase in price.93 
Studies have shown that the incentive of the long-term capital 
gains preference to delay the sale of stocks with unrealized appre-
ciation until the holding period requirement is satisfied has a sta-
tistically significant impact on the time at which investors sell 
stock. In 1968, Fredland, Gray, and Sun ley found that the amount 
of short-term gains realized from the sale of stock was relatively 
high in the first month of the holding period, but then steadily 
declined until the sixth month when it increased slightly.94 A dras-
tic increase in the'realization of gains then occurred in the seventh 
month when gain from the sale of the stock was eligible for prefer-
ential treatment as a long-term capital gain.911 These findings were 
subsequently confirmed by Professor Kaplan in 1981.96 
Although no studies have similarly documented the impact of 
the holding period requirement of the short-short rule on the in-
vestment behavior of mutual funds, common sense indicates that 
the funds' investment behavior would be similarly influenced. 
Since fund investment managers would not want to lose flow-
through status for income tax purposes, it seems likely that the 
fund managers would delay the sale of securities until after the 
three-month holding period.97 
of Econ, Research, Working Paper No. 762) (Sept. I, 1981) . 
•• Stocks have been found to have a downward sloping demand curve and therefore, stock 
prices respond to changes in supply. See Shleifer, supra note 60, at 588-89. 
Indeed, one could further hypothesize that after the holding period requirements were 
satisfied, the prices of risky stocks might then rapidly drop. This could happen since ra-
tional investors would be most likely to sell stocks which they view as risky immediately 
after the holding period is satisfied in order to lock in the gain with respect to those stocks. 
See Constantinides, Optimal Stock Trading with Personal Taxes: Implications for Prices 
and the Abnormal January Returns, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 65, 73 (1984). The sudden increase in 
supply of those stocks, all other factors remaining the same, would cause prices to drop . 
.. See Fredland, Gray & Sunley, supra note 16, at 470 . 
•• See id. Constantinides has hypothesized that taxpayers may be particularly eager to 
sell volatile stocks immediately after the holding period requirement is satisfied in order to 
lock in the gain. See Constantinides, supra note 93, at 73. 
M See S. Kaplan, supra note 92, at 4 . 
• 7 The loss of flow-through status would have a significantly harmful impact on stock-
holders of the mutual fund. Consider a mutual fund that earns $100 of income which it 
distributes to its stockholders. If the stockholders are in the 28-percent tax bracket, they 
would pay a tax of $28 and have $72 left as disposable income. Contrast that situation with 
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It could be argued that the distortive impact of holding period 
requirements is minimal in a rationally efficient market because at 
any given time, although some investors would be holding securi-
ties to satisfy the requirement, the majority of investors would 
have satisfied the requirement.9s Thus, the majority of investors 
would not be restrained in responding to market forces. However, 
it is possible that a significant percentage of investors could be 
subject to a holding requirement at the same time in a rationally 
efficient market. If this occurred, holding period requirements 
would have a major distortive impact. 
A significant percentage of investors could be simultaneously re-
strained by holding period requirements if a rational speculative 
bubble occurred. Several commentators have asserted that price 
deviations from fundamental values can arise from rational behav-
ior which forms a rational speculative bubble.99 A rational specula-
tive bubble may exist when the actual market price of a security 
depends upon future changes in the price. That is, such a bubble 
may occur when investors measure their returns, not just from div-
idends, but from changes in the price of the stock as well. In that 
situation, rational expectations of price increases by many inves-
tors may cause prices to diverge from their fundamental values by 
what happens if the fund lost its flow-through status. The fund would probably pay tax at 
the highest corporate bracket, 34 percent, and thus would pay taxes of approximately $34. 
That could leave $66 to be distributed to stockholders. If the stockholders in turn pay taxes 
at the rate of 28 percent, their after-tax income would be only $47.52 . 
•• See generally, Somers, Reconsideration of the Capital Gains Tax, 13 Nat'l Tax J. 289, 
292 (1960) ("Since short-term gains are taxable as ordinary income while long-term gains 
are subject to lower rates if properly handled, the over-all impact [of the capital gains pref-
erence) on the supply curve will depend partly on the (weighted) number of short-term and 
long-term profit-takers as well as loss-takers.") 
.. See, e.g., Azariadis, Self-fulfilling Prophesies, 25 J. Econ. Theory 380, 380-81, 395 
(1981); Blanchard & Watson, Bubbles, Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets in Cri-
ses in the Economic and Financial Structure 295, 295-99 (P. Wachtel ed. 1981); Flood & 
Garber, Bubbles, Runs and Gold Monetization, in Crises in the Economic and Financial 
Structure 275, 275-76 (P. Wachtel ed. 1981); Meese, Testing for Bubbles in Exchange Mar-
kets: A Case of Sparkling Rates, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 345, 346 (1986). See also Tirole, On the 
Possibility of Speculation Under Rational Expectations, 50 Econometrica 1163, 1178-97 
(1982) (formulating a model using the rational expectations theory which allows for the for-
mation of speculative bubbles); Van der Ploeg, Rational Expectations, Risk and Chaos in 
Financial Markets, 96 Econ. J. 151, 151-52 (Supp. 1986) (hypothesizing that rational specu-
lative bubbles occur in the bond market). For an interesting account of many historical 
bubbles, see C. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes (1978). 
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increasing the demand for a security.loo The price increases would 
in turn attract other investors who, anticipating further price infla-
tion, would also purchase the security, and, as a result, further in-
flate the price. IOI Those investors who were attracted to the secur-
ity by the increases in prices would be subject to a holding period 
requirement during the same time period. The incentive to hold 
the securities rather than sell into a rising market could contribute 
to an additional inflation in prices by restricting the supply of se-
curities. At some point, the bubble would burst, perhaps because 
of adverse news of some nature. I02 
The issue whether rational speculative bubbles actually occur in 
the stock market has generated controversy. At least one study has 
concluded that rational speculative bubbles do not occur in the 
stock market. lOS Other commentators, while refusing to state that 
bubbles never occur, have expressed great skepticism about the ex-
istence of bubbles because of the stringent conditions which the 
100 Shleifer has found that stocks have a downward sloping demand curve which results in 
price changes when demand for the stock changes. See Shleifer, supra note 60, at 588-89. In 
a similar vein, others have noticed that transactions involving large sales or purchases of 
blocks of securities have an impact on stock prices. See, e.g., Easley & O'Hara, Price, Trade 
Size, and Information in Securities Markets, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 69, 69-71 (1987); Holthausen & 
Leftwich, supra note 60, at 237-38, 264-65; Krauss & Stoll, supra note 60; LaHarris & Gurel, 
Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 List: New Evidence for 
the Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. Fin. 815, 828 (1986) (increase in the volume of trad-
ing in stock results in increases of price volatility of the stock.) 
101 Gikas Hardouvelis of the Research and Statistics Group of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York explained rational speculative bubbles as follows: 
In the case of a rational speculative bubble, investors know that the bubble may 
crash and that they will not be able to get out once the crash starts, but they remain 
in the market because they believe-for whatever reason-there is good probability 
that the bubble will continue to grow, bringing them large positive returns. These 
returns are expected to be higher than the risk-free rate plus the usual risk premium 
in the absence of bubbles, and large enough to compensate them exactly for the 
probability of a bubble crash and a large onetime negative return. Hence it is rational 
for investors to stay in the market. 
Hardouvelis, Evidence on Stock Market Speculative Bubbles: Japan, the United States, and 
Great Britain, 13 Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Q. Rev. 4, 5 (Summer 1988). 
10. See Blanchard & Watson, supra note 99, at 299 (the probability that the bubble ends 
may well be a function of how long the bubble has lasted, or how far the price is from 
market fundamentals). 
103 See B. Diba & H. Grossman, Rational Bubbles in Stock Prices? Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper No. 1779 at 19-21 (1985). See also West, Bubbles, Fads and Stock 
Price Volatility Tests: A Partial Evaluation, 43 J. Fin. 639, 648-50 (1988) (while the 1987 
crash is consistent with the existence of a speculative bubble, the conditions for bubbles are 
too stringent to make bubbles particularly attractive). 
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mathematical descriptions of speculative bubbles contain. l04 One 
of the most descriptive and realistic models for speculative bubbles 
was formulated by Professor Tirole. l06 But for a bubble to exist 
under the Tirole model, securities prices must be in excess of their 
fundamental values (meaning that only positive bubbles can ex-
ist),I°6 and the mean growth rate of the economy must exceed the 
mean return on stocks. l07 Commentators argue that these condi-
tions may be too restrictive to suggest that rational speculative 
bubbles exist. lOS 
Despite the difficulties in formulating realistic mathematical 
models for rational bubbles, other commentators have suggested 
that they actually occur in the securities markets. l09 While this has 
not yet been conclusively confirmed, 11 ° a recent study by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York has "isolated evidence consistent 
with the hypothesis of rational bubbles in the national stock mar-
. kets of Japan and the United States before the October [1987] 
crash."lll Consequently, holding period requirements could con-
tribute significantly to market distortions in a rational market in 
the event a rational speculative bubble occurred. The holding pe-
riod requirement would encourage investors to hold, rather than 
sell, their stock in a rising market and, as a result, contribute to 
.04 See West, supra note 103, at 650. 
'0. See Tirole, Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations, 53 Econometrica 1499 (1985) 
(presentation of Prof. Tirole's model). See also Tirole, supra note 99, at 1163-81. 
... See Tirole, Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations, supra note 105, at 1503, n.8. 
'07 See id.; West, supra note 103, at 649 (explaining Tirole's model) . 
• 08 West, supra note 103, at 650 . 
• 00 See, e.g., Tirole, Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations, supra note 105, at 1513-
14; Ackley, Commodities and Capital: Prices and Quantities, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. i, ·13 (1983). 
110 See Meese, supra note 99, at 346 ("There exists, however, very little academic empiri-
cal evidence on which we might assess the validity of this 'bubbles' hypothesis."). Indeed, 
some of the literature has noted just how difficult it is to show the impact of speculative 
bubbles on stock prices because of problems in determining fundamental values of stocks. 
See, e.g;, Flood & Hodrick, Asset Price Volatility, Bubbles, and Process Switching, 41 J. Fin. 
831, 832, 839-40 (1986); Blanchard & Watson, supra note 99, at 314; Shiller, supra note 83, 
at 61. 
11. Hardouvelis, supra note 101, at 15. This evidence was found by determining whether 
stock prices prior to the October crash included a component (the "bubble premium") 
which rewarded investors for the risk associated with the inevitable collapse of bubble 
prices. See id. at 7-10. Hardouvelis hypothesized that as the bubble progressed, the bubble 
premium should also grow progressively larger as the risk of loss from the bubble bursting 
increased. See id. Hardouvelis' analysis of price data suggested that this did in fact occur. 
See id. at 8-15. 
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the inflation of stock prices above their fundamental values. 
V. IRRATIONAL STOCK MARKETS, HOLDING PERIOD REQUIREMENTS, 
AND SOCIETAL WELFARE 
Although speculation in a rationally efficient market is innocu-
ous since stock prices will by definition accurately reflect their fun-
damental values (unless a rational speculative bubble occurs), 
speculation may be harmful to societal welfare if the market is ir-
rational. The hallmark of an irrational market is that prices fre-
quently vary from fundamental values. Speculation would be 
harmful if short-term trading exacerbated the variance of stock 
. prices from their fundamental values. This could occur, for exam-
ple, if irrational speculators began to purchase and hold a particu-
lar stock based on some irrational or emotional expectation that 
the stock's price would increase. The activity of purchasing and 
holding the stock could inflate the price of the security above its 
fundamental value. 
Variance of stock prices from the fundamental values has several 
negative effects. Stock prices influence plans for capital formation 
regardless of whether the stock market is rational.ll2 Thus, the va-
riance of stock prices from their fundamental values in an irra-
tional market impedes planning for capital formation, because it 
generates uncertainty about the returns associated with various in-
vestments.lIS Excessive variance could also cause investors to de-
mand a greater return from stock because of the risk associated 
with investing in an irrational market, thereby depressing stock 
prices and raising the cost of capital to businesses.u4 Moreover, 
... See Fischer & Merton, supra note 89, at 94; Marsh & Merton, Dividend Variability 
and Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock Market Prices, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 
483, 484 (1986). Others have argued, however, that stock prices are too volatile to be closely 
related to investment. See Malinvaud, Wages and Unemployment, 92 Econ. J. 1 (1982). 
Ueda and Yoshikawa argue that volatility in stock prices arise from movements in the dis-
count rate. They state that for short-term investments which do not involve a long lead 
time, management must evaluate investment using the volatile discount rate if management 
wishes to further the interest of the stockholders. However, for investments which will not 
be productive immediately, management will ignore the discount rate because it is domi-
nated by temporary components and will instead focus on the profitability of the long-term 
project. See Ueda & Yoshikawa, Financial Volatility and the Q Theory of Investment, 53 
Economica 11, 22 (1986). 
113 F. Edwards, supra note 87, at 5-6 . 
• 1< See Malkiel, The Capital Formation Problem in the United States, 34 J. Fin. 291, 306 
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excessive variance may diminish the confidence of investors in the 
market and cause them to withdraw from the market, thereby re-
ducing market liquidity and also raising the return remaining in-
vestors would demand from their investments. lUi 
If speculation contributes to the variance of stock prices from 
their fundamental values in an irrational market, the harm arising 
from speculation could be substantial. However, as will be ex-
plained, holding period requirements also contribute to the vari-
ance of stock prices from fundamental values in an irrational mar-
ket and consequently do not constitute an effective or appropriate 
method for improving societal welfare in an irrational market. 
A. Is the Stock Market Rational? 
There have been several early studies which have examined the 
rationality of the stock market and have concluded that it is ra-
tional. lIs Indeed, one commentator stated that the existence of a 
rationally efficient market seemed to be the best established em-
pirical fact in economics.ll7 Unfortunately, the literature to date is 
not conclusive that the stock market operates in a rationallyeffi-
cient manner, and further doubts naturally arose in the wake of 
the October 1987 crash. Following the crash, Professor Shiller com-
mented, "The efficient market hypothesis is the most remarkable 
error in the history of economic theory. This is just another nail in 
its coffin. "118 
Recently, several authors have challenged the notion that prices 
in capital markets reflect prices that would have been established 
in rationally efficient markets. ll9 Those studies most relevant to 
(1979); Pindyck, Risk Inflation and the Stock Market, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 335, 346-47 (1984); 
R Pindyck, Risk Aversion and Determinants of Stock Market Behavior 4 (Alfred P: Sloan 
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Working Paper No. 1801-86, 
1986). 
110 F. Edwards, supra note 87, at 6 . 
.. 8 See, e.g., E. Fama & M. Miller, The Theory Of Finance, 336-37 (1972); B. Lev, Finan-
cial Statement Analysis: A New Approach 223 (1974); Fama & MacBeth, Risk Return and 
Equilibrium: Empirical Tests, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 607 (1973); Ronn, On The Rationality Of 
Common Stock Return Volatility, 21 Fin. Rev. 355 (1986). 
117 See Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. Fin. Econ. 
95 (1978). 
118 Donnelly, Efficient Market Theorists are Puzzled by Recent Gyrations in Stock Mar-
ket, Wall St_ J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 7, col. 4. 
118 See, e.g., Modigliani & Cohen, Inflation, Rational Valuation and the Market, 35 Fin. 
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the desirability of using holding periods to influence investor be-
havior relate to whether stock market prices are more volatile than 
rational behavior would indicate and whether the market over-
reacts to news. 
The major theoretical argument against the idea that market 
prices may not always reflect fundamental values because the mar-
ket behaves irrationally is that rational investors would quickly 
take advantage of the profit opportunity, and, as a result, the price 
variance would almost immediately disappear. If prices of stocks 
were below fundamental values, rational investors would purchase 
those stocks and the increased demand would drive the prices up. 
If prices of stocks were above fundamental values, rational inves-
tors would sell or engage in short sales of those stocks and drive 
pri~es back down to the stocks' fundamental values. 
However, Professor Shiller has argued that the profit opportu-
nity created by irrational investors may not be large enough to at-
tract rational investors.120 Shiller posits a situation in which a 
stock with a dividend yield of 4.5 percent is bid up by enthusiastic 
investors with the result that its price doubles. If the enthusiasm is 
unpredictable and if no reason exists to believe that such enthusi-
asm will subside in the near future, then the anticipated yield falls 
to only 2.25 percent. Shiller argues that this small change in yield 
"does not present any dramatic, riskless profit opportunity 
through short sales or option markets"l21 which means that the 
"inefficiency" will not be immediately corrected. Moreover, Profes-
sor Arrow has observed that a minority of rational investors may 
not influence the market if a majority of investors are behaving 
irrationally.122 And Professor Summers has stated that "[t]here are 
no grounds for assuming either that irrational traders will be elimi-
nated, or that they will be unable to move market prices. "123 
Analysts J., Mar.-Apr. 1979, at 24-44 (suggesting that stock market overreacted to inflation); 
Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Divi-
dends?, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 421 (1981) (stock prices are more volatile than rational prices 
would be); Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. 
Fin. 591, 600 (1986). 
110 See Shiller, supra note 83, at 59; Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, 1984 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 457; Summers, supra note 119, at 591-600. 
III Shiller, supra note 83, at 59. 
122 See Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 Econ. Inquiry 1, 7-8 
(1982). 
123 Summers, supra note 119, at 599. See also Russell & Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi 
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1. Excess Volatility 
One important implication of an irrational market is that it 
would exhibit excessive price volatility. Shiller124 and othersl2Ci 
have argued that the stock market is irrational because stock mar-
ket prices change too much to be equivalent to prices that would 
be established in a perfectly rational market. Their conclusion is 
based on studies in which they compared the movement of stock 
price indices to the present value of the subsequent dividends of 
the stock which comprise the indices.126 Shiller concluded that the 
amount of movement in stock prices was five to thirteen times too 
high to be attributed to new information about anticipated 
dividends. 127 
The foregoing findings, however, have been challenged based on 
the use of the present value of dividends as a proxy for the funda-
mental value of the stocks. Commentators have argued that the 
formula Shiller used to calculate the present value of the subse-
quent dividends assumed that management sets dividends to grow 
at a specified rate.128 They assert that management does not 
blindly adhere to a dividend policy which requires dividends to 
grow at a specified rate but instead deviates from such a growth 
plan in response to changes in the long-term sustainable earnings 
of the corporation.129 Thus, the commentators conclude that the 
volatility observed by Shiller does not indicate that the market is 
behaving irrationally but rather only indicates a dividend policy 
which is more volatile than assumed by Shiller.130 
Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 1071, 1071 (1985) ("We show that 
the knee-jerk reaction of some economists that competition will render irrationality irrele-
vant is apt only in very special cases, probably rarely observed in the real world."). 
, .. See Shiller,supra note 83, at 60; Shiller, supra note 119, at 433-34; Shiller, The Use of 
Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 36 J. Fin. 291, 303-04 (1981) . 
... See, e.g., Grossman & Shiller, The Determinants of the Variability of Stock Market 
Prices, 71 Am. Econ. Ass'n Papers and Proceedings 222, 226 (1981); Joerding, Are Stock 
Prices Excessively Sensitive to Current Information?, 9 J. Econ. Behavior and Org. 71, 75-80 
(1988); LeRoy & Porter, The Present-Value Relation: Test Based Implied Variance Bounds, 
49 Econometrica 555, 571 (1981). 
lOS See id. 
117 See Shiller, supra note 119, at 433-34 . 
... See Marsh & Merton, supra note 112, at 491. 
... See Marsh & Merton, supra note 112, at 488-89. See also Kleidon, Anomalies in Finan-
cial Economics: Blueprint for Change?, 59 J. Bus. S469, S485 (Supp. 1986). 
IS. For other commentators who made similar arguments, see Copeland, Do Stock Prices 
Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends: Comment, 73 Am. 
HeinOnline -- 8 Va. Tax Rev. 623 1988-1989
1989] Holding Period Requirements 623 
2. Fads and Noise 
Shiller has argued that "fashions" and "fads" may cause the ex-
cess volatility he had observed. "Fashions" and "fads" are terms 
Shiller uses to describe his theory, based upon psychological and 
sociological studies, that stock prices may be influenced simply by 
group psychology or the "herd" instinct. lSI In effect, Shiller has led 
the theory of market behavior full circle back to Keynes who sug-
gested that markets are sometimes driven by emotions that do not 
reflect economic reality.132 Shiller states: 
Modern psychology does not r~duce human behavior to a simple 
model like the expected utility model that underlies theoretical fi-
nance. The literature on gambling behavior shows the plausibility 
made in the usual anecdotes [of market crashes] that there is 
sometimes excessive enthusiasm for certain financial assets and 
thus that other financial assets are sometimes ignored. The litera-
ture on salience and human judgment makes plausible the claims 
in the anecdotes that popular attention to certain speculative as-
sets was capricious. The literature on group polarization of atti-
tudes adds some further plausibility to the claim in the anecdotes 
that groups of individuals may tend to act together, reaching the 
same decisions around the same times.l3S 
Thus, Shiller posits that investors acting in concert may drive 
prices above their fundamental value. However, the direct statisti-
cal evidence regarding fads and fashions is inconclusive. Professor 
West has stated that "[t]he quantitative evidence in favor of fads 
as an explanation of stock price volatility is largely indirect, in the 
form of negative verdicts on bubbles and on traditional models for 
returns .... But at present there is little formal positive evidence 
to sway someone unsympathetic to fads models."l34 West has sug-
gested, however, that fads could explain the runup in stock prices 
in 1987 and the subsequent crash.1311 
Econ. Rev. 234, 234-35 (1983). However, Professor Kenneth D. West in a recent paper ar-
gues that he has corrected for these deficiencies and still found that stock prices are too 
volatile to be explained by rationality. West, Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatil-
ity, 56 Econometrica 37, 50-51, 58 (1988). 
lSI Shiller, supra note 83. 
m See J. Keynes, supra note 88, at 56, 59. 
us Shiller, supra note 83, at 65. 
m West, supra note 103, at 654. 
13. See West, supra note 103, at 652. 
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Somewhat similar to the group psychology theory of fads is 
"noise theory." Fisher Black drew upon the concept of noise theory 
in 1986 to explain why stock prices do not necessarily reflect fun-
damental values. l36 Rather than focus simply on fads, he suggested 
that investors could make decisions based on a number of factors 
which may not relate to the fundamental value of the security.137 
For example, Professor Trueman has suggested that managers of 
investment funds trade securities when the information they pos-
sess does not justify trading in order to create the appearance for 
their customers that they have non public information about cer-
tain securities.138 Similarly, West has suggested that the hypothesis 
of Shillerl39 regarding the influence of psychological and sociologi-
cal factors on investment decisions further illustrates the impact 
that noise trading by naive investors has on the markets.14o 
If the market is irrational and ruled by investor emotions, it 
would be easy to envision the "herd" instinct hypothesized by 
Shiller causing prices to inflate above their fundamental value as 
demand for the favored stocks increased. But what happens when 
some event causes the herd instinct to reverse? Is there any evi-
dence that stock prices drop below their fundamental value in re-
action to negative news? If so, one could envision a market with 
sharp swings of prices above and below their fundamental values. 
3. Market Overreaction 
Studies suggest that the stock market does overreact to news in 
adjusting the prices of securities. Given that psychologists have 
found that persons overreact to new information in making judg-
ments about the probability of future events occurring, HI it is per-
haps not surprising that several studies have reported that stock 
prices temporarily depart from their underlying fundamental val-
ues as a result of investors overreacting to reported earnings. For 
example, Professors DeBondt and Thaler assert that they have 
... See Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 529, 529, 530-34 (1986). 
137 See id. at 529 . 
... See Trueman, A Theory of Noise Trading in Securities Markets, 43 J. Fin. 83, 83-84, 
88 (1988) . 
... See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
14. See West, supra note 103, at 652. 
14' See Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 
211 Science 453 (1981). 
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found "considerable evidence consistent with the simple hypothe-
sis"142 that investors overreact to reported earnings.143 Interest-
ingly, the authors found that the responses to earnings reports 
were asymmetrical. Investors appear to overreact more strongly to 
negative news than positive news. This finding is consistent with 
the suggestion of other commentators that the aggravation that 
persons experience in losing money seems to be greater than the 
pleasure of gaining the same amount. 144 
DeBondt and Thaler found that stocks which had the largest 
losses during a three-year period had gains in the subsequent five-
year period which were 19.6 percent greater than what would have 
been expected based on the capital asset pricing model. 1411 The 
sharp rebound in prices indicates that the stocks were priced below 
their fundamental value during the initial three-year period. One 
might question whether test periods that are so long are indicative 
of investor overreaction or some other phenomenon, since human 
nature is to overreact for a short period, not years.148 However, 
Professors Brown and Harlow have found that stocks with the 
largest losses during a one-month period had the largest gains the 
following month.147 Indeed, they state that there is strong evidence 
that the shorter the duration of the initial price changes, the more 
I •• DeBondt & Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market 
Seasonality, 42 J. Fin. 557 (1987) . 
... DeBondt & Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. Fin. 793, 799-805 (1985) . 
... See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
Econometrica 263, 279 (1979) . 
... The formula which is based on the capital asset pricing model and which is used to 
calculate excess return is as follows: 
ERit = Rit - ai - bi Rmt 
where ERit = excess return on stock i for day t 
Rit = actual return on stock i for day t 
Rmt = return on the market portfolio for day t 
ai = constant, estimated for a period prior to the 
event 
bi = beta of stock i, a measurement of non-
diversifiable risk, estimated from a period 
prior to the event 
Debondt & Thaler, supra note 143, at 799-805 . 
... Indeed, Fama and French have suggested that DeBondt's and Thaler's findings can 
also be explained by time-varying equilibrium expected returns that are highly autocorre-
lated but mean reverting. See Fama & French, Permanent and Temporary Components of 
Stock Prices, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 246, 248 (1988). 
,.7 See Brown & Harlow, Market Overreaction: Magnitude and Intensity, 14 J. Portfolio 
Mgmt. 6, 7 (Winter 1988). 
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extreme the subsequent response. H8 Brown and Harlow conclude: 
The revelation of unfavorable news may well induce traders to 
quickly limit their downside losses, thereby creating market pres-
sures that depress prices below levels justified by the information 
itself. The longer-term results, on the other hand, also indicate 
that investors in the affected company continue to sell their shares 
for several years after the initial event-which suggests that stocks 
that are judged initially to be "losers" tend to remain that way in 
the long run, despite the presence of any short-run adjustment. I • 9 
Not all commentators conclude that the findings of DeBondt, 
Thaler, Brown and Harlow challenge the rationality of the stock 
market. Some commentators have argued that the findings do not 
represent overreaction by investors but are consistent with changes 
in the expected return of the security.150 Moreover, Professor Chan 
has argued that DeBondt and Thaler may have misapplied the 
capital asset pricing model when they failed to consider that the 
risks of stocks are not constant over time. m When Chan factored 
this into the calculation, he found only negligible excess returns for 
the same sample data used by DeBondt and Thaler.162 
Chan's challenge illustrates a recurrent problem with attempts 
to analyze whether the stock market is rational. In order to deter-
mine whether a security or portfolio of securities has excess returns 
it is necessary to first calculate what its "normal" return should 
have been. This task is not always easy to perform. For example, 
the accuracy of the capital asset pricing model has been increas-
ingly challenged, prompting some commentators to state that "[i]t 
may be only a slight overstatement to say that only in the legal 
literature is [the capital asset pricing model] considered an accu-
rate account of market processes."Ul3 
... See id . 
... Id. at 12 . 
... See Fama & French, supra note 146, at 248. 
'6' See Chan, On the Contrarian Investment Strategy, 61 J. Bus. 147, 160 (1988) . 
... Id. at 153 . 
... Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and Securities Research, 
60 N.Y.V. L. Rev. 761, 765 (1985). 
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B. Impact of the Holding Period Requirement of the Long-
Term Capital Gains Preference in an Irrational Market 
If the stock market is irrational and fads do in fact occur, the 
holding period requirement of the long-term capital gains prefer-
ence could intensify the inflation of stock prices above fundamen-
tal values. This would result if investors hold rather than sell their 
stocks in a rising market and thereby limit the supply of securities. 
As mentioned earlier, studies have shown that the tax incentive to 
delay the sale of stocks with unrealized appreciation until the long-
term holding period is satisfied has a statistically significant im-
pact on the time at which investors sell stock. 
If a fad caused an inflation of stock prices, one could further 
hypothesize that when the fad dissipated, investors would over-
react and rush to sell securities with losses. This would be particu-
larly true if the losses could be deducted from ordinary income for 
federal income tax purposes as was the case for short-term capital 
losses. 154 The investors' rush to sell securities with losses would ac-
celerate the decrease in prices. 
To date however, no study has statistically confirmed that inves-
tors accelerate recognition of their losses in order to qualify the 
losses as short-term capital losses. In fact, a recent study by 
Professors Lakonishok and Smidt suggests that they do not. 155 
Lakonishok and Smidt hypothesized that the volume of sales of 
stock with losses should be greatest in the final month of the hold-
ing period because transaction costs would cause investors to wait 
until the last moment to realize the 10ss.156 To test this hypothesis, 
they compared the volume of sales of stocks which had exper-
ienced losses in the previous five months in a period when the 
holding period requirement was six months to the volume of sales 
'" Prior to the repeal of the capital gains preference, taxpayers who were not corpora-
tions could deduct up to $3000 of short-term losses from ordinary income. I.R.C. § 
1211(b)(I)(B) (1954). Interestingly, even after the repeal of the capital gains preference, 
taxpayers who are not corporations may still only deduct up to $3,000 of their short-term 
capital losses from ordinary income. I.R.C. § 1211(b)(I)(B). 
100 Lakonishok & Smidt, Volume for Winners and Losers: Taxation and Other Motives 
for Stock Trading, 41 J. Fin. 951, 961, 973 (1986). 
lO. Indeed, it seems likely that investors would also wait until the last moment in the 
hope that the losses would be reversed. Investors clearly prefer to realize gains rather than 
losses. Lakonishik and Smidt found that the volume of trading in stocks with gains is signif-
icantly higher than the volume of trading in stocks with losses. See id. at 961, 973. 
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for stocks which had experienced losses in the previous eleven 
months in a period when the holding period requirement was 
twelve months. If investors tended to sell stocks with losses in the 
final month of the holding period, the volume of the sale of losers 
should have been higher for the fifth month in the period when the 
holding period requirement was six months than the period when 
the requirement was twelve months. Conversely, the volume of 
losers should have been higher in the eleventh month when the 
holding period was twelve months than when the holding period 
was six months. However, they found no statistically significant 
difference. 
It is difficult to determine the implications of the findings of 
Lakonishok and Smidt. It is possible that tests which compare the 
total volume of sales of stocks with losses during the short-term 
holding period to stocks with losses after the holding period re-
quirement is satisfied would find a statistically significant differ-
ence. But to date, no such studies have been published. It is also 
possible that the limitation of the deduction of the short-term 
losses from ordinary income plays a role in significantly diminish-
ing the tax motive to sell short-term losers.167 
c. Impact of the Holding Period Requirement of the Short-
Short Rule 
Similar reasoning suggests that the holding period requirement 
of the short-short rule can diminish societal welfare. If fads occur 
. and if mutual funds had purchased stock at the start of the fad, 
the funds would not be able to sell into a rising market and help 
defuse the fad without risking the loss of flow-through status for 
federal income tax purposes. Moreover, even if fads do not occur, 
107 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1559, taxpayers who 
were not corporations were limited to deducting $1,000 of short-term capital losses from 
ordinary income. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 raised the limit to $2,000 for 1977 and $3,000 
for subsequent years. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1401(a), 1401(b), 90 Stat. 1559, 1731. It is also 
possible that investors are simply reluctant to sell stocks with losses. The so-called "disposi-
tion effect theory" postulates that investors have a propensity to sell stocks with gains and 
to hold on to stocks with losses. See, e.g., Ferris, Haugen & Makhija, Predicting Contempo-
rary Volume With Historic Volume at Differential Price Levels: Evidence Supporting The 
Disposition Effect, 43 J. Fin. 677,677 (1988); Shefrin & Stateman, The Disposition To Sell 
Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. Fin. 777, 778 
(1985). 
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the holding period requirement still distorts prices, although not as 
greatly, by causing funds to restrict artificially the supply of secur-
ities until the requirement is satisfied. 
One potential benefit of the short-short rule is that it discour-
ages mutual funds from selling into a falling market after a bubble 
bursts or fad dissipates. However, this potential benefit does not 
outweigh the harm created by discouraging the funds from selling 
into a rising market for two reasons. First, stockholders of the 
open-end mutual funds l1l8 could thwart the beneficial impact of the 
incentive. Open-end funds are required to redeem stock of their 
stockholders at the request of stockholders.11l9 If a sufficient num-
ber of stockholders who are discouraged by a falling market seek to 
have their stock in open-end mutual funds redeemed, the funds 
would be required to sell stock in order to have sufficient cash for 
the redemption regardless of the desire of management of the 
funds not to violate the short-short rule.160 Second, because inves-
tors overreact more strongly to negative news than positive news, 
any beneficial impact arising from the funds not selling into a fall-
ing market would probably be overwhelmed by the overreaction of 
other investors eager to exit the market. 
1&8 Open-end mutual funds are funds that offer redeemable shares of stock which are 
traded primarily through redemption and reissuance by the mutual fund at the per share 
net asset value of the fund. See T. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 579 (1985). 
Most mutual funds are open-end funds. See id. 
". Under section 22(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-22(e), 
mutual funds may only suspend the right of redemption when (1) the New York Stock 
Exchange is closed or has restricted trading (2) during an "emergency" which causes re-
demption to be "not reasonably practicable," or (3) in accordance with rules issued by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"). 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-22(e) (West 1981 & 
Supp. 1988). To date the SEC has not issued any rules. 
180 While it is far from certain that mutual fund activity played any role in the stock 
market crash on October 19, 1987, the following anecdotal information is interesting. Ac-
cording to the Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, IV-l to IV-2 
(Jan. 1988), mutual fund liquidity is usually maintained at a level equal to one month of 
stockholder redemptions. On October 19, mutual fund stockholders sought to have stock 
valued at $2.3 billion redeemed. Id. The funds were able to meet approximately two-thirds 
of all redemptions through cash reserves. Id. Of a sales volume of approximately $21 billion 
on the New York Stock Exchange on October 19, however, mutual funds accounted for $963 
million dollars of that sales volume. Id. at 36, IV-I. 
Although it is not clear whether the redemptions caused funds to fail the short-short rule, 
the Wall Street Journal reported that "the crash caused" approximately 20 mutual funds to 
violate the short-short rule. Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 5. 
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D. Summary 
The use of holding period requirements is not an appropriate 
response to stock market volatility. There is no conclusive evidence 
that the type of short-term trading which would be discouraged by 
holding period requirements contributes to volatility. Even if 
short-term trading did contribute to volatility, volatility would not 
be harmful unless it caused stock prices to vary from this funda-
mental value as determined in a rationally efficient market. Under 
the efficient market theory, rational investors assure that prices do 
not stray from their fundamental values. Consequently, in a ra-
tionally efficient market, holding periods are not needed. Indeed, 
holding periods distort prices in a rationally efficient market by 
artificially restricting the supply of stocks. This distortion could be 
extremely harmful if rational speculative bubbles occur. 
If the stock market behaves irrationally, short-term trading 
could contribute to the variance of prices from their fundamental 
values. However, holding period requirements are not an appropri-
ate method for curbing speculation in an irrational market because 
they increase the probability that prices will vary from their fun-
damental values in two ways. First, they decrease the supply of 
securities while the holding period requirement is being satisfied. 
Second, they may reinforce irrational investor behavior such as 
that involved in fads and, as a result, contribute to the inflation of 
stock prices above their fundamental values. The inflated prices 
may then drop below fundamental value as investors overreact to 
negative news. 
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Long-Term Capital Gains Preference 
Clearly, the preference for long-term capital gains should not be 
reenacted if the primary purpose for its reenactment is to reduce 
market volatility. However, other rationales for reviving the prefer-
ence have been offered. I81 Because those rationales are controver-
161 One rationale for the restoration of the capital gains preference is that it will increase 
revenues by encouraging taxpayers to sell capital assets which have appreciated in value. 
See Darby, Gillingham, & Greenlees, supra note 6, at 2; Lindsey, Capital Gains Taxes Under 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986: Revenue Estimates Under Various Assumptions, 40 Nat'l Tax 
J. 489, 489 (1987). However, several commentators have argued that it is likely that restora-
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sial and have been extensively discussed in other literature,162 they 
will not be discussed here. It is important to note, though, that any 
benefits which may be identified in rationales for reenacting the 
preference should be weighed against the costs to societal welfare 
which have been discussed in this article.16s 
tion of the preference would reduce, rather than increase revenues. See, e.g., Minarik, The 
New Treasury Capital Gain Study: What Is In The Black Box?, 39 Tax Notes 1465 (June 
20, 1988). 
Another rationale for restoration of the preference is that it is unfair to tax appreciation 
that has been accrued over a period of time at a progressive rate, particularly where the 
appreciation is partly attributable to inflation. See B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, 
Estates and Gifts, 11 3.5.7 at 3-61 (1981); Nilson, Neutral Capital Gains Taxation Under 
Inflation and Tax Deferral, 31 Nat'l Tax J. 401 (1978); Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital 
Gains Preference, Part I: The Problem of Inflation, Bunching, and Lock-In, 48 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 313, 354-56 (19;7). However, this problem could be addressed by taxing only real ap-
preciation not attributable to inflation. Various proposals for tax reform have suggested 
indexing capital gains to the inflation rate. See, e.g., Capital Gains Tax Bills: Hearings On S. 
2428, S. 2608, and S. 3065 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Gener-
ally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 95th Congo, 2d Sess. at 151 (1978) (statement of Wil-
liam Penick) (proposing indexation of inflation so that only real economic gain would be 
taxed); U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 5 (2d ed. 1984) (sug-
gesting that capital gains be fully taxed upon sale or exchange after stepping-up the basis to 
account for inflation); U.S. Dep't of the Treas., Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and 
Economic Growth 101 (1984) (proposing step-up in basis of assets to account for inflation); 
President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity 166-71 (pro-
posing that taxpayers be permitted to elect to index the basis of capital assets sold during 
the taxable year in lieu of taking the capital gains deduction). 
Another rationale is that incentives for capital formation are needed. See e.g., Landau, 
U.S. Economic Growth, 258 Scientific American 44, 50 (1988) (government should provide 
incentives for investment). However; it is not clear that a capital gains preference is the best 
method to stimulate capital formation. A more direct stimulant, such as investment credits, 
may be more efficient in stimulating capital growth. See, e.g., Summers, Investment Incen-
tives and the Discounting of Depreciation Allowances, in The Effects of Taxation on Capital 
Accumulation 295, 302 (M. Feldstein ed. 1987) (investment credits are a potent incentive for 
capital formation) . 
• 0. See sources cited supra note 161. 
.8. It is also important to note that if the preference is restored for one of the reasons 
discussed in note 161, supra, a holding period requirement may be appropriate despite the 
costs arising from the distortion of the markets. This may result from a desire to provide 
some horizontal equity to taxpayers, i.e., to tax professional securities traders at the same 
rate as the ordinary income of non-traders. It may also result from the fact that the revenue 
loss associated with not having a holding period is greater than the harm created by the 
market distortion. But see Office of Economic Research of the New York Stock Exchange, 
Revenue Estimates of an Elimination of the Capital Gains Holding Period, 20 Tax Notes 
515 (Aug. 15, 1983) (elimination of holding period would increase revenue). 
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B. The Short-Short Rule 
In contrast to the preference for long-term capital gains, little 
attention has been devoted to an examination of the rationales, in 
addition to reducing short-term trading and market volatility, for 
the short-short rule. Accordingly, this article will now examine 
these additional rationales. 
1. The Short-Short Rule Does Not Assure Preservation of 
Capital 
In addition to stating that the short-short rule prevents short-
term trading, the Service has asserted that the rule assures the 
preservation of capita}.184 However, this assertion is counterintui-
tive. If investment managers can be trusted to select the types of 
securities to purchase and the time at which such purchases should 
be made, it seems arbitrary to impose a restriction on the time at 
which they may sell such securities. The restriction prevents in-
vestment managers from taking action which they may deem ap-
propriate to preserve the capital of the fund's stockholders. 
A poignant illustration of the deleterious impact of the short-
short rule is found in mutual funds' efforts to hedge their portfo-
lios. Various hedging transactions can help prevent a diminution in 
value of securities. However, these hedging transactions, in 
preventing a decrease in value, can also generate short-short gain 
which could disqualify the mutual fund for flow-through status. 
The hedging transactions utilized by mutual funds usually in-
volve the short sales of securities186 held by the funds, the 
purchase of options to sell securities188 held by funds, and the sale 
of stock index futures. The short sale of a security and the 
purchase of an option to sell a security held by a fund can result in 
the termination of the holding period of the security for purposes 
of the short-short rule. 187 Moreover, gain arising from the sale of 
'04 See Rev. Rul. 75-376, 1975-2 C.B. 267, 268 (1975). 
'8' See supra note 84 (discussion of short sales). 
'88 An option to sell a security gives the option holder the right to sell a security at a 
specific price at any time up to and including the maturity date of the option. Options to 
sell are usually called "puts." Id. at 232. 
'87 Rev. Rul. 74-434, 1974-2 C.B. 195. Treasury Regulation § 1.1092(b)-2T(d) has the ef-
fect of preventing the termination of the holding period for stock with respect to which 
stock index futures are sold. 
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futures contracts can frequently be realized prior to satisfaction of 
the three-month holding period requirement of the short-short 
rule. 
In 1986, Congress, recognizing this problem, attempted to pro-
vide an exemption to the short-short rule for hedging transactions. 
Congress accomplished this by modifying the computation of gross 
income of a fund and its gains from the sale of securities held for 
less than three months for purposes of section 851(b)(3). Section 
851(b)(3) requires that less than 30 percent of a mutual fund's 
gross income be derived from the sale or exchange of stock or se-
curities held for less than three months. Congress modified this 
rule by adding section 851(g)/68 which provides that for purposes 
of calculating gross income and short-short gain, positions which 
are part of a "designated hedge" should be netted.169 That is, any 
increase in value of a position that is part of a "designated hedge" 
will be reduced by any decrease in value of the offsetting position, 
whether or nqt realized, for purposes of calculating the short-short 
gain and gross income. In order to qualify as a "designated hedge," 
the positions of the hedge must be "clearly identified by the tax-
payer in the manner prescribed by regulations."l70 
The Conference Committee Report explained that the rationale 
for this treatment was that hedging transactions are "consistent 
with the passive nature" of mutual funds. l7l However, the method 
of netting gains and losses in identified hedges does not protect 
mutual funds which identify their hedges in all situations. In en-
acting this provision, Congress was in effect assuming perfect li-
quidity between the futures and stock market so that price dispari-
ties cannot occur. However, perfect liquidity between the two 
markets does not always exist with the result that decreases in 
value of stock will not always be perfectly matched by an equal . 
increase in the value of the futures contracts.172 Consider for exam-
ple the events of the stock market crash in October, 1987. On both 
Monday, October 19, and Tuesday, October 20, 1987, the prices of 
stock index futures were frequently trading at prices far below the-
, •• I.R.C. § 851(g). 
,., Id. 
170 Id. 
171 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, supra note 38, at 11-245. 
m See Merrick, Portfolio Insurance With Stock Index Futures, 8 J. Futures Mkts. 441, 
442 (1988). 
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price of the underlying portfolio of stocks.173 Consequently, mutual 
funds which had hedged their portfolio by selling stock index fu-
tures and then subsequently closed those futures transactions 
would have realized substantial net short-short gains when the 
gains from the stock index futures held for less than three months 
were netted against the losses of their portfolios. It is reported that 
this phenomenon actually resulted in some mutual funds losing 
"their flow-through status as a result of the October crash.174 
2. The Short-Short Rule is not Equitable 
The final rationale for the short-short rule was offered by the 
Conference Committee for the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Re-
port of the Conference Committee stated: 
The conferees believe that the requirement that a RIC derive less 
than 30 percent of its gross income from the sale or other disposi-
tion of stock or securities held for less than three months is an 
appropriate requirement to ensure that a RIC is a passive entity 
that is appropriately granted pass-through status.17II 
This rationale is questionable. The pass-through status of mu-
tual funds is based on the idea that mutual funds "provide a 
means by which investors, including those of moderate means, can 
obtain the professional investment management and diversification 
of risk available to large institutions and the most wealthy individ-
ual investors."176 Because the flow-through status of mutual funds 
represents a departure from the normal treatment of corporations 
as separate tax entities, it makes sense to preclude mutual funds 
from carrying on an active trade or business. l77 To do otherwise 
would give mutual funds an unfair advantage over large publicly 
held entities, such as corporations and master limited partner-
ships, which are generally treated as separate taxable entities. 
173 See, e.g., Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, supra note 
160, at 46. 
17. Falloon, Catch-30, 5 Intermarket, Apr. 1988, at 23, 23-24. 
17. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, supra note 38, at 11-245. 
17. Issues Relating to Passthrough Entities: Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R. 2571, H.R. 3397, 
H.R. 4448 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways 
and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 194 (1986) [hereinafter Passthrough Entity Hearings) 
(statement of Richard M. Reilly). See id. at 105 (statement of R. Donald Turlington). 
177 See id. at 116-17, 135 (statement of Dennis E. Ross, Tax Legislative Counsel, U.S. 
Dep't of Treas.). 
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However, if the reference to "passive entity" in the quoted Con-
ference Committee Report178 is intended to mean that the short-
short rule assures that mutual funds will not engage in business 
activities, then the short-short rule is redundant. That require-
ment is already addressed by section 851(b)(2) which requires that 
at least 90 percent of the fund's income be derived from "divi-
dends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans ... and 
gains from the sale or other disposition of stock or securities.IIl79 
Trading in securities has historically not been viewed as an active 
trade or business.18o For example, while tax-exempt organizations 
are subject to tax on "unrelated business taxable income,"181 gains 
from trading securities are exempt from taxation regardless of the 
extent of the activity182 because Congress viewed securities trading 
as essentially passive in character.18s Similarly, the trading of se-
curities is not treated as an active trade or business for purposes of 
section 355 of the Code, and income from trading securities is 
treated as "passive" income for S corporations which are taxed as 
flow-through entities under Subchapter S of the Code.18• 
Moreover, the Code treats all other flow-through entities differ-
ently from mutual funds. For example, S corporations and partner-
ships are not subject to any restrictions on trading securities. And 
section 584 of the Code and the regulations thereunder which per-
mit a bank to commingle and invest funds of various trusts with-
out creating a separate taxable entity impose no restrictions on the 
bank's trading activities with respect to the commingled funds. 
Similarly, tax-exempt institutions, perhaps the greatest beneficiary 
of tax preferences, are not subject to such a restriction. 
17. Supra text accompanying note 174. 
178 I.R.C. § 851(b)(2). 
,.0 See, e.g., Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) (Court ruled that taxpayers 
management of his investment portfolio did not constitute a "trade or business" under the 
predecessor of section 162(a»; Main Line Distribs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 562 (6th 
Cir. 1963) (taxpayer was not engaged in business of trading in securities for purposes of 
section 162); Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 176, at 133. But see Commissioner v. 
Nubar, 185 F.2d 584, 588 (4th Cir. 1950) (extensive trading of securities is a trade or busi-
ness under statutory predecessor of I.R.C. § 871, dealing with non-resident aliens). 
181 I.R.C. § 512(b). 
,.2 See Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 176, at 135. One exception to this rule is 
for gain arising from securities whose purchase was debt financed. See I.R.C. § 514. 
I •• See H.R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 409; S. 
Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31, reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 506 . 
.. 4 See Passthrough Entity Hearings, supra note 176, at 135. 
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The disparity of treatment between tax-exempt institutions and 
mutual funds is a significant anomaly. If a valid concern of tax 
policy is to minimize short-term trading, then the largest players in 
the capital markets-pension funds and university endow-
ments-which are tax-exempt, should be subject to the same re-
striction. Because of the distortion to the markets created by the 
holding period requirement, it is preferable that the short-short 
rule be repealed. Indeed, it is ironic that section 851(a)(1) of the 
Code requires that the mutual fund be registered with the SEC 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. ls5 The 
Investment Company Act already has several provisions which are 
intended to protect stockholders from the excesses of manage-
ment. lS6 The short-short rule actually diminishes rather than en-
hances the welfare of mutual fund shareholders, and, therefore, in 
effect conflicts with the goal of the Investment Company Act to 
protect stockholders. 
Thus, the rationales advanced in support of the short-short rule 
cannot' withstand scrutiny, and the costs to societal welfare of the 
restrictions imposed by the short-short rule are significant. The 
lack of any persuasive rationale and the existence of significant so-
cietal costs argue for the repeal of the short-short rule. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This article has suggested that holding period requirements are 
an inappropriate method to curb speculation. If the stock market 
is rational, holding period requirements distort investment deci-
sions and decrease societal welfare. If, on the other hand, stock 
markets are irrational, holding period requirements can still de-
crease societal welfare. Thus, the preference for long-term capital 
gains should not be reenacted if the primary purpose for its reen-
actment is to curb speculation. Similarly, the short-short rule 
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 80b-2 (1982 & Supp. 1986). 
186 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-9 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (prohibiting persons convicted 
of felonies or misdemeanors arising from securities transactions from serving as an officer, 
employee or investment advisor of a mutual fund); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-10a (West 1981) (re-
quiring disinterested directors); 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-l(b) (West 1981) (imposing fiduciary du-
ties on directors of funds). Moreover, excessive trading of a mutual fund's portfolio which 
had the effect of enriching a mutual fund's investment advisor was found to violate § 17(a) 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 V.S.C.A. § 77(y)(a) (West 1981). First Multifund Advisory 
Corp., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'iI 83,313 (Dec. 30, 1982). 
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should be repealed. 
This does not mean, however, that we should abandon consider-
ation of other methods for employing the tax code to impact inves-
tor behavior. Strong evidence exists that the stock market over-
reacts to negative news and is influenced by irrational behavior.187 
Some mechanism may be appropriate, therefore, which would en-
courage investors to pause before they trade in reaction to negative 
news. Perhaps such a mechanism will result from further research 
and analysis of this issue. ISS 
187 See supra text accompanying notes 119-124. 
188 One mechanism worthy of further consideration is a stock transfer tax. Berkowitz and 
Logue have suggested that the increase in short-term trading by institutions has been 
caused by the decrease in transaction costs associated with trading activities. Berkowitz & 
Logue, The Portfolio Turnover Explosion Explored, 13 J. Portfolio Mgmt. 38, 42-44 (Spring 
1987). A transfer tax would increase transaction costs and perhaps, as a result, reduce port-
folio churning. However, such a tax could also have several negative effects. The tax would 
probably increase the cost of capital to securities issuers. And this increased cost could send 
issuers overseas to avoid the tax, thereby weakening domestic capital markets. Conse-
quently, more study and careful analysis is needed before a definitive recommendation can 
be made. 
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